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ABSTRACT
An employment relationship consists of many dimensions other than monetary
compensation. Textbook economic theory implies employers and employees will agree
upon an efficient level of such nonwage compensation based on an employee's prefer-
ences and the employer's cost. At the same time, most types of nonwage compensation
are set in a context of substantial regulation, legal restrictions, and other interven-
tions. This dissertation investigates how regulatory intervention and other changes
to the external environment affect firms' decisions regarding two types of nonwage
compensation: workplace safety and employment mobility.
Chapter One investigates how media coverage of employers caught violating work-
place safety and health regulations affects future compliance. Using quasi-random
variation in media coverage induced by a policy change at the Occupational Safety
and Health Administration (OSHA), I find coverage about one employer leads to
significantly higher compliance among other employers likely exposed to it. The re-
sults are most consistent with employers acting defensively to avoid their own future
publicity. This work contributes to a growing literature investigating how providing
information to stakeholders about sellers' quality leads to quality improvements.
Chapter Two examines how workplaces respond to health and safety regulatory
enforcement inspections. We first analyze the effects of randomized inspections on
vi
safety and business outcomes of inspected workplaces. We find inspections lead to
significantly fewer injuries and have no detectable effect on business outcomes. We
then attempt to identify the types of workplaces where inspections are more or less
effective.
Chapter Three investigates why employers have employees sign non-compete agree-
ments (NCAs), which contractually limit where the employee can work in the event
of a job separation. NCAs may solve hold-up problems that limit incentives to invest
in transferable assets (e.g. general human capital). At the same time, NCAs may
impose large costs on employees who sign them. We develop a model of how labor
market conditions and liquidity constraints can jointly determine the decision to in-
clude an NCA in a hiring contract. We find strong support for the model's predictions
using a survey we conducted among employers in the high-end hair salon industry,
one in which NCAs are a large and growing phenomenon.
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1Chapter 1
Regulation by Shaming: Deterrence Effects
of Publicizing Violations of Workplace
Safety and Health Laws
Abstract: Ratings, scores and other forms of information provision are increasingly
seen as a tool to incentivize firms to improve their quality or attributes, but less is
understood about policies which exclusively publicize firms discovered to have the
lowest quality attributesi.e. shaming." Shaming may affect the decisions of publi-
cized firms, and perhaps of greater policy relevance is its deterrent effect on not-yet
publicized firms. After a 2009 policy change, the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA) began issuing press releases about workplaces found to be in
violation of safety and health regulations if the penalties levied for those violations
exceeded a cutoff. Using quasi-random variation induced by this cutoff, I estimate the
effect of publicizing violations by one workplace on its own subsequent compliance
with OSHA regulations, and also the spillover effect onto the compliance of peer"
workplaces most likely exposed to the publicity. Workplaces with a peer whose vio-
lations were publicized significantly improve compliance with safety and health reg-
ulations. These spillover effects decrease with geographic and industry distance" to
the publicized workplace, and the response appears to be driven by employers acting
to avoid their own future publicity, rather than by updating beliefs over the prob-
ability of future regulatory enforcement. Finally, the magnitude of spillover effects
associated with a press release diminish in the years after the policy's introduction,
2suggesting the information content relevant to employers was strongest for the earliest
press releases.
1.1 Introduction
Information provision has increasingly become a tool regulators and other agencies
use to encourage firms to improve their quality or performance (Delmas et al 2010).
These policies are guided by the basic economic insight that markets function better
when consumers have more information about quality: providing information about
firms' quality can reduce information asymmetries between firms and their stakehold-
ers, leveraging pressure from those stakeholders that incentivize firms to upgrade their
quality. Indeed, a growing academic literature has generally found information provi-
sion policies lead publicized, rated, or otherwise revealed firms to improve the quality
of the attributes under scrutiny.1 However, in practice, many disclosure regimes are
far from complete: some regimes only seek to provide information about those at
the extreme ends of the performance distribution, such as eBay's top rated seller"
certification, or 24/7 Wall St's annual Worst Companies to Work For" list. Apart
from affecting the performance of revealed firms, such regimes may have spillover, or
deterrence, effects onto the behavior of other unrevealed firms. This paper estimates
how publicizing the performance of poorly performing firmsi.e. shaming"affects
future performance by other, non-publicized firms.
Spillover effects from information provision could arise for several reasons. For
example, unrevealed firms may anticipate having their quality revealed in the future,
or they may learn from the information provided about revealed firms. Furthermore,
the magnitude, direction and reach of these spillover effects has enormous implications
for targeting decisions by agencies designing information disclosure regimes. Indeed,
1Some examples are restaurant hygiene (Jin and Leslie 2003), to drinking water quality (Bennear
and Olmstead 2008), to environmental ratings (Chatterji and Toffel 2010).
3as in any program evaluation, failing to account for a policy's spillover effects on a
non-treated group can lead to biased estimates of the program's impact and biased
policy recommendations. However, the empirical challenges to identifying spillover
effects of information provision can be severe. Along with issues like omitted variables
that can bias a comparison between firms who are and are not rated poorly, additional
challenges arise when attempting to identify spillover effects. For example, given that
information provided about revealed firms is typically publicly available by design,
finding a set of peers indirectly affected by the disclosed information, and a comparison
group unaffected, can be difficult.
This paper overcomes these challenges to estimate the spillover effects of informa-
tion provision using an empirical approach that provides quasi-random variation in
poorly performing employers which did or did not their performance publicly revealed,
and a setting which provides a natural way to define employers which were and were
not exposed to this publicity. In 2009, the Occupational Safety and Health Adminis-
tration (OSHA)the regulatory agency charged with setting and enforcing workplace
safety and health regulations in the U.S. began issuing press releases about employ-
ers found to be violating OSHA regulations in a recent inspection, a policy referred
to as regulation by shaming" by the Assistant Secretary of Labor. 2 These press
releases were almost always covered by local newspapers and industry trade publi-
cations, and they describe the violations found, the penalties issued, and often use
language suggesting the employer was not committed to protecting its workers from
safety hazards. Specifically, OSHA began issuing press releases about employers that
were cited with financial penalties above a particular cutoff in a recent enforcement
inspection.
The initiation of this policy offers a unique opportunity to estimate the extent to
2Michaels, David. OSHA at Forty: New Challenges and New Directions. July 19, 2010. Available
here: https://www.osha.gov/as/opa/Michaels_vision.html
4which publicizing information about one employer's regulatory performance affects
the behavior of non-publicized employers. Firstly, OSHA's press releases significantly
increased publicity about workplace safety violations from a very low baseline, and
thus the 2009 policy change was akin to increasing the threat of publicity from the
viewpoint of employers. Second, because the policy change instituting the cutoff rule
was only announced internally at OSHA and not to the broader community, the only
way for employers to become aware of the increased threat of publicity induced by
the policy was to observe realized publicity. Given the local and industry-specific
media distribution of OSHA's press releases, media coverage following a press release
about an employer was most likely observed by geographically proximate employers
in the same industry. Thus, estimating how a press release affects the compliance of
neighboring employers of the publicized employer provides an opportunity to cleanly
test the spillover effects of the regulation by shaming" policy.
Guided both by the cutoff rule OSHA used to issue press releases, and the local and
industry-specific media pickup of these press releases, this paper estimates the effects
of a press release about one employer on the subsequent compliance of other employers
most likely exposed to the press release ("peers"). Using a Regression Discontinuity
(RD) design, the estimation strategy compares the compliance of employers whose
peer was recently cited with OSHA penalties just above the cutoff, to that of employers
with a peer recently cited with penalties just below the cutoff. Furthermore, the paper
investigates the extent to which spillover effects are a function of peers' proximity to
the publicized employer, both geographic and technological (proxied by industry), by
varying the narrowness with which peer groups are defined.
The analysis finds that a press release revealing an employer to be violating health
and safety standards has significant and very large spillover effects. Using shared
zip code and sector as a baseline definition of peers, employers with a peer cited
5with penalties just above the press release cutoff have on average 43 percent fewer
violations and 39% lower financial penalties than employers with a peer inspected
with penalties just below the cutoff. These spillover effects shrink in magnitude
but remain statistically significantwhen we broaden peer groups to have a wider
geographic range (county), or omit the industry criterion, supporting the importance
of proximity.
One potential concern with this analysis is compliance with OSHA regulations
is only observed conditional on an inspection being opened. If being exposed to a
press release affects the probability an inspection happens, the estimated effects on
compliance could be biased. Explicit tests on the effect of exposure to press releases
on inspections occurring, and restricting the compliance regressions to inspections
whose occurrence are exogenous to events at the workplace, show the results are
unaffected by this concern in practice. Additionally, results are robust to a wide
range of alternative specifications, and placebo checks using different cutoffs, and the
same cutoff in states without the press release policy, strongly support the validity of
the results.
The paper then considers mechanisms that could be driving the deterrence effects
of press releases. One potential mechanism is that publicity about safety violations
damages an employer's reputation, and employers improve their compliance following
a press release about a peer as a preemptive investment to avoid their own negative
publicity (reputational deterrence). Indeed, since press releases were often covered
by local newspapers and industry trade publications, media coverage following a press
release could be seen by its consumers, potential new workers, up/downstream firms,
and competitors, and each of these stakeholders may value attention to workplace
safety for a variety of reasons. An alternative mechanism that could explain the ef-
fects is if reading a press release about an inspection of one's peer changes employers'
6beliefs about the probability of OSHA enforcement (enforcement deterrence); be-
cause OSHA only inspects a small subset of operating workplaces every year, many
employers may be unaware of OSHA's inspection and enforcement activities, and a
press release about large penalties at a recent inspection could lead employers to
update the penalties they expect to receive from OSHA for a given level of noncom-
pliance.
Several pieces of evidence suggest that reputational deterrence is driving the
results. First, the spillover effects of press releases are not moderated by employers'
experience with OSHA enforcement prior to 2009; if some employers update their
beliefs about OSHA enforcement upon reading a press release, updating should be
strongest for those which have been subject to low rates of enforcement in the past.
Second, several years after the press release policy has been in place, there is a leftward
shift in the distribution of OSHA penalties just around the press release cutoff. At
the same time, there appears to be very little, if any, change in compliance at the
bottom of the distribution (at zero) and the right tail. This behavior suggests, in the
long run, employers try to improve compliance just enough to surely avoid a press
release, potentially highlighting limited long-term benefits from shaming.
This paper's findings provide a novel contribution to a literature on the disciplinary
effects of information provision and the media. While the papers cited in Footnote 1
investigate how firms respond to being rated, publicized or scored, this paper is one
of, if not the, first in this literature to estimate the deterrence effects of information
provision on non-publicized firms. Other papers have investigated the deterrence
effects of information provision in domains other than firm performance: Lee (2013)
finds the introduction of public access to criminal records has a large deterrence
effect on first-time crime, but the opposite effect on criminal recidivism. In the
realm of politics, Snyder and Stromberg (2010) show U.S. Congressmen in districts
7with less local political coverage perform worse for their constituents, and Larreguy,
Marshall and Snyder (2014) provide evidence that press coverage leads voters to
punish malfeasant local elected officials.
This paper also contributes to the literature on the deterrence effects of regulatory
enforcement. A large literature has investigated the effects of enforcement inspections
on the future compliance of an inspected (focal) facility,3 and a smaller literature has
tried to estimate the spillover effects of enforcement on other (non-focal) facilities.4
At least in the environmental domain, the consensus in this literature seems to be
that rigorous monitoring and enforcement remains the number one motivator for
many facilities' environmental compliance decisions (Gray and Shimshack 2011).
The findings of this paper suggest the media and shaming have been overlooked
as powerful forces governing employers' compliance decisions, at least for safety and
health.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 provides a brief
conceptual framework of why media coverage about safety may affect compliance and
other investments in safety. Section 2.2 provides institutional background of OSHA's
press release policy and describes the data, and Section 2.4 develops the empirical
methodology. Section 2.5 provides the results of the empirical analysis, and Section
1.6 provides robustness and placebo checks to test the validity of the results. Section
2.7 investigates the mechanism behind the main result and where the effects of press
releases are the strongest. Finally, Section 3.5 concludes.
3As just two examples in a very large literature, see Weil (1996) for OSHA inspections and Hanna
and Oliva (2010) for EPA inspections.
4 Shimshack and Ward (2005) find that EPA inspections resulting in a fine result in a substan-
tial reduction in the statewide violation rate, whereas inspections with no fine have no detectable
effect, which the authors interpret as evidence that general deterrence operates through regulator
reputation. Thornton et al (2005) conducted a survey among 233 manufacturing firms and found
that the number of examples of enforcement actions at other firms that respondents could recall was
significantly and positively associated with whether the respondent reported having taken action to
improve environmental performance, though they (rightly) caution the causality could run in the
opposite direction.
81.2 Conceptual Framework
This section briefly discusses why a policy publicizing employers who violate work-
place safety and health regulations would affect employers' future compliance with
these regulations and other investments in health and safety.
Firstly, publicity suggesting an employer is uncommitted to protecting its work-
ers could change the market's beliefs about an employer's compliance with safety
and health regulations. An employer's compliance with safety and health regula-
tions could provide a signal of different dimensions of its quality for different types
of stakeholders. For example, consumers or downstream trading partners may in-
fer that non-compliance with safety standards is indicative of labor unrest, which has
been shown to lead to lower product quality (Mas 2008). More directly, potential new
workers may view non-compliance as a signal of poor workplace safety culture with
higher risk of injury, and as a result demand higher wages (Rosen 1986). However,
if these stakeholders cannot directly observe an employer's compliance with safety
regulations, the market's beliefs about its quality can be thought of as an employer's
reputation for quality.5 Publicizing an employer's compliance performance provides
information about its quality, and this increase in transparency can alleviate informa-
tion asymmetries which otherwise enable employers with poor safety compliance to
remain in the market. Publicity about violating safety standards thus imposes an ad-
ditional cost on noncompliance, above and beyond enforcement penalties, insurance
premiums, and other existing costs on noncompliance.
A policy that publicizes only the worst non-compliers, as in the setting considered
in this paperwould provide a very particular incentive scheme with respect to firms'
compliance decisions. When consumers and other stakeholders can only learn about
a firm's quality through bad news, such as only learning of a firm's compliance
5The phrase reputation for quality is taken directly from Board and Meyer-ter-Vehn (2013).
9when it is very low (and violations are high), Board and Meyer-ter-Vehn (2013)
show firms' incentives to invest in quality improvements is increasing in their current
reputation. If news revealing poor compliance damages a firm's reputation, then
not-yet publicized employers (whose reputation will be high, on average) invest to
increase their compliance to avoid being the object of future reputation-damaaging
news. On the other hand, the compliance incentives for already-publicized employers
(whose reputation has been damaged) are less clear: if being publicized damages an
employer's reputation enough, publicized employers' best response may actually be to
(weakly) decrease their investments in compliance; in the absence of a mechanism for
stakeholders to learn about improvements in quality, an employer's reputation may
never be able to recover after bad publicity about safety violations, in which case
incentives to invest in quality improvements are low. 6
An alternative way publicity detailing violations found at a recent OSHA inspec-
tion could affect compliance is by changing employers' beliefs about the probability
of future OSHA enforcement. While neoclassical models of compliance view agents as
choosing compliance based on all present and future expected benefits and costs, in
reality these decisions may be made in the presence of imperfect information. There
are hundreds of safety and health regulatory standards, and given this regulatory com-
plexity even the most well-intentioned firm may not be perfectly compliant (Malloy
2003). A press release could affect employers' beliefs about the probability of en-
forcement: because OSHA only inspects a small subset of operating workplaces every
year, many employers may be unaware of OSHA's inspection and enforcement activi-
ties. Media coverage detailing violations at a recent inspection of one employer could
lead other employers to update their beliefs over the expected costs of noncompli-
6Of course, in reality the effects of publicity on firms' reputations and incentives to invest in
compliance will be influenced by other factors. For example, the extent to which stakeholders view
compliance with safety and health regulations as a signal of quality will vary widely across different
industries and employers.
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ance imposed by regulatory enforcement, either through beliefs about the probability
of inspection or the expected fine conditional on inspection (Becker (1958)). More
generally, press releases could have a behavioral effect simply by making safety stan-
dards more salient to managers, or by reminding them that OSHA is out there.
Reminders which make the cost of an agent's actions more salient have been shown
to affect behavior in energy use (Gilbert and Zivin 2014) and individual saving (Kar-
lan et al 2010). Notably, under this story, press releases should have no effect on
compliance decisions of the publicized employer, as it learns no new information from
the information in media coverage about itself.
An additional way a press release could change employers' beliefs about OSHA
enforcement is by beliefs over the priorities of enforcement: because press releases
provide detailed descriptions of the specific violations found in an inspection, and
the penalty associated with each violation, a press release could signal that OSHA is
cracking down on a particular set of regulations.
1.3 Institutional Background and Data
1.3.1 OSHA's Press Release Policy
OSHA's primary tool to enforce its health and safety regulations is inspections of
workplaces. During these inspections OSHA inspectors survey a workplace's oper-
ations and assess its compliance with standards. Inspections can be triggered by
a complaint (by an employee or member of the public) alleging safety and health
hazards at a worksite, a referral' (an allegation of hazards made by an inspector,
government agency or media), what is called a catastrophe (worker fatality or hos-
pitalization of three or more workers), or otherwise pre-planned (programmed), for
example as part of a national emphasis program for a certain industry or type of safety
hazard. If, during the inspection, the inspector finds the workplace out of compliance
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with any standards, she issues violations for each regulation not being followed. The
inspector then calculates the appropriate financial penalty for each violation, which
are a function of the size of the employer, number of employees exposed to the haz-
ard, and the likelihood the violation would lead to a severe accident. Penalties are
typically issued a few months after an inspection takes place.
For at least the past decade, OSHA's ten regional offices around the country
would issue a press release detailing the violations found and penalties issued at an
inspection if the regional office deemed one appropriate. The regional office would
then send the press release to local media, and industry trade press, at least one of
which nearly always takes up the story. Figure 1·1 gives an example of such news
coverage: an inspection of a poultry processing plant in Gainesville, GA. was begun in
January 2009, and the inspector issued $73,275 in penalties on April 16, 2009. OSHA
immediately issued a press release about the inspection, which begins by suggesting
the plant was not committed to protecting its workers and had not made safety part
of its culture. The article then proceeds to describe the specific violations found
during the inspection in detail, citing the plant's lack of standard guardrails and
using flexible cords instead of fixed wiring, among others. The same day that
OSHA issued its press release, the story appeared in the plant's local newspaper, the
Gainesville Times.
Before 2009, the criteria used to determine whether to issue a press release was
largely left to OSHA's ten regional offices. These criteria varied substantially across
regions. Some regions used a cutoff rule; Regions 1 and 4 (covering New England and
the Southeast, respectively) issued press releases for inspections resulting in penalties
of at least $40,000, and Region 5 (in the Midwest) used $100,000. Some regions
effectively issued no press releases at all.
However, in May 2009 OSHA's national headquarters in Washington D.C. decided
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to standardize these criteria across regions. As a result, a common cutoff of $40,000
was instituted for Regions 1-4, 6, 9, and 10, and a cutoff of $45,000 for Regions 5,
7 and 8.7. These cutoffs were not announced publicly, and were only communicated
internally, an important detail to support the validity of the empirical design that
follows. Statements by OSHA officials reveal the policy was intended both to reveal
exceptionally high violators to the general public, and also to provide publicity about
OSHA's enforcement activity. David Michaels, the Assistant Secretary of Labor and
Director of OSHA, has called press releases regulation by shaming, suggesting the
intent that press releases impose a cost on publicized employers and add a disincen-
tive to violate OSHAS regulations.8 Additionally, press releases are meant to serve
educational and deterrent purposes for other companies in the same industry and
geographic area. 9
Figure 1·2 illustrates the effect of the 2009 policy change on the number of press
releases issued by OSHA, and media coverage of OSHA violations, each year 2002-
2011. For media coverage, I use the number of articles found on newslibrary.com that
contain OSHA in the title, and violations anywhere in the text. Panel (a) plots
these series for Regions 1 and 4, which were using the $40,000 cutoff rule at least
as early as 2002, and panel (b) plots for the other later-adopting regions. Prior to
2009, there are consistently very few press releases issued outside of Regions 1 and
4. Starting in 2009, there is a muted increase in the number of releases in Regions
1 and 4, and a much more drastic increase everywhere else. The almost one-to-one
relationship between number of press releases and newspaper articles shows the 2009
policy change significantly changed the frequency of media coverage about OSHA
7OSHA officials were unsure of the reasons behind the difference in this cutoff across regions.
8Michaels, David. OSHA at Forty: New Challenges and New Directions. July 19, 2010. Available
here: https://www.osha.gov/as/opa/Michaels_vision.html
9Comments from Patrick Kapust, deputy director of OSHA Directorate of Enforcement Programs,
in December 1, 2012 interview: http://www.safetyandhealthmagazine.com/articles/examining-the-
top-10-2?page=2
13
violations, albeit to a greater degree in some parts of the country than others.
While this policy change made the probability of a press release a discontinuous
function of penalties, in practice the cutoff rule was not a sharp one. Some inspections
with penalties below the cutoff resulted in a press release anyway if, for example,
novel violations were found that pose a new and little-publicized kind of hazard.
Finally, some inspections above the cutoff would not get press releases if the inspector
did not send the necessary information to the regional office in time to be relevant.
Furthermore, OSHA's 10 regions varied in their adherence to the policy. The fuzziness
of this design is incorporated into the empirical analysis.
1.3.2 Data
The primary data source used in the analysis is OSHA's Integrated Management
Information System (IMIS), which contains detailed information on each of OSHA's
inspections started between January 2001 and December 2012. Key variables included
are the date the inspection is opened, the type of inspection (complaint, accident, pro-
grammed, other), workplace characteristics (address, industry, number of employees
present, whether the employees are represented by a union, etc). As for compliance
measures, a detailed report of each violation found (if any) is included with the type
of each violation, its corresponding financial penalty, and the date the violations are
issued (typically a few months after the date the inspection is opened). I collapse the
data to the establishment-inspection level by summing each type of violation and all
penalties levied at each inspection. Since many establishments are inspected multiple
times throughout the sample period, but at varying rates, the data constitute an
unbalanced panel.10
For most of the analysis, I restrict attention to inspections with penalties issued
10IMIS does not keep a unique establishment identifier to track the same establishment over time.
Thus, various fuzzy matching techniques were used to link records of the same establishment over
time. I thanks Melissa Ouellet for help with this endeavor.
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May 2009 and after, since this is when OSHA made its press release policy relatively
uniform, and with penalties issued before December 2011, to provide sufficient post-
inspection data through December 2012 (when the dataset ends). The press release
policy does not cover the 21 states with state-run OSHA offices, so inspections in these
states are excluded, except for a placebo check on the main results. I also exclude
Regions 2 and 3 (covering primarily New York and New Jersey), as the data suggest
these regions did not adhere to the cutoff rule. Finally, I exclude inspections in the
mining industry (< 1% of total inspections), as this industry is under the jurisdiction
of the Mine Safety and Health Administration, rather than OSHA's.
Summary statistics are provided in Table 1.1 separately for the entire sample of
inspections, and for the subset of inspections with penalties within $10,000 of the press
release cutoff for its corresponding region (within $30,000 and $50,000 for Regions 1,
4, 6, 9, and 10, and within $35,000 and $55,000 for Regions 5, 7 and 8). Most
inspections result in relatively small penalties: out of the nearly 93,000 inspections
during this period, the average inspection results in just under $4,500 in penalties
(but is highly skewed) and just 1 percent result in penalties above the corresponding
press release cutoff. That the press release cutoff is at the 99th percentile of the
penalty distribution supports the idea the policy was intended to expose the highest
violators. The average inspection finds 2.6 violation, while the average inspection in
the subset around the press release cutoff finds nearly 11 violations.
Roughly 60 percent of inspections in the whole sample are programmed (i.e.
planned ahead of time) and 34% are triggered by a complaint, referral or catastro-
phe, with the remaining 6.3% classified otherwise.11 However, the share of complaint
or catastrophe inspections rises to 51% in the sample near the cutoff.12 The average
workplace in the subsample with penalties near the cutoff is roughly twice as large (in
11The categories in other include monitoring, variance, and follow-up inspections.
12In the IMIS database, the average penalty issued from complaint or catastrophe inspection
during this period was $4690, whereas the average for all other inspections was $2,300.
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terms of employment) and 50 percent more likely to be unionized than the average
workplace in the whole sample.
The final panel of Table 1.1 shows the distribution of inspections across sectors. 13
OSHA inspections are concentrated largely among construction and manufacturing
workplaces, both in the whole sample as well as the subsample around the press
release cutoff.
Because many of these variables are so skewed to the right, I topcode count vari-
ables at their respective 99th percentiles, and I take logs of continuous variables
(penalties, # employees), to ensure the analysis is not vulnerable to outliers.14
To determine the extent to which the cutoff rule for issuing press releases was
followed in practice, I linked the IMIS data to the set of archived press releases on
OSHA's website to create an indicator for each inspection in IMIS equal to 1 if the
inspection resulted in a press release.15 Figure 1·3 uses the results of this linking
to illustrate the discontinuity at the cutoff. The Figure makes clear the probability
an inspection results in a press release jumps significantly at the cutoff by 25-30
percentage points, highlighting the presence of the discontinuity but also the imperfect
adherence to the policy by OSHA.
1.4 Empirical Strategy
Identifying Spillover Effects of Press Releases on non-publicized employers
The primary goal of this paper is to understand how publicizing the performance of
employers egregiously violating health and safety regulations affects the subsequent
13Sectors are roughly 2-digit NAICS codes, except codes 31-33 are pooled for Manufacturing, 44
and 45 are pooled for Retail Trade, 48 and 49 are pooled for Transportation and Warehousing, and
1-digit 5-9 are pooled for Services
14For logged variables, I add the first non-zero percentile of each variable before taking the log to
account for zeroes.
15The archive of OSHA's press releases since 2001 is available here:
https://www.osha.gov/newsrelease.html
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compliance decisions of other, non-publicized employers. However, an empirical chal-
lenge to estimating these spillover effects is identifying a set of treated employers
exposed to (but not necessarily the subject of) such publicity and a set of control
employers not exposed to (and, presumably, unaware of) any publicity about OSHA
violations.
Fortunately, the introduction of OSHA's press release policy offers a unique setting
to identify these spillover effects. Because OSHA's policy change to begin publicizing
egregious violators was not made known to the general public, arguably the only way
for employers to be made aware of this new policy was to observe a press release di-
rectly. The media outlets through which OSHA distributed its press releases provides
plausible classifications of the types of employers likely exposed to a particular press
release. Firstly, OSHA typically sent its press releases to local (and not national) me-
dia outlets, meaning that employers located nearby the publicized employers would
be more likely to be exposed to ensuing media coverage. Secondly, press releases were
also typically sent to (and covered by) industry trade publications. As a result, a
press release would be most likely seen by other employers in the same region and
industry as the publicized employer.
Other details reinforce the idea that employers sharing the same region and in-
dustry would view publicity about one another's OSHA compliance. For one, the set
of standards OSHA checks for in an inspection, as well as the likelihood a particular
employer will be inspected at all, varies widely by industry (Weil 1996), and as a
result the description of the violations in a press release are likely to be more relevant
to other employers in the same industry. Furthermore, network ties between firms
have been shown to have a significant geographic component (Jaffe, Trajtenberg and
Henderson 1993), suggesting employers located near each other are in greater contact
than with those further away.
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Based on these factors, in my baseline specification I group workplaces into "peer
groups" if they share the same zip code and industry (with industry classifications
corresponding to those at the bottom of Table 1.1).
1.4.1 Measuring Compliance (and the effect of publicizing it)
As discussed in Section 1.2, there are several reasons to believe the introduction of
OSHA press releases would increase employers' subsequent compliance with safety
and health standards. However, estimating the causal effects of press releases on
compliance is complicated by the inconvenient fact that the true state of a work-
place's OSHA compliance is unobservable. The IMIS data provide a measure of
compliance conditional on being inspected based on the assessment of the inspector.
One approach would be to compare measured compliance at future inspections of
workplaces who have and have not been exposed to a press release. However, this
comparison could be biased if observing a press release changes the types of work-
places who get inspected. Because such inspections are irregular, and are often a
response to an event (accident, complaint, etc), in general the occurrence of an in-
spection itself is endogenous. If press releases affect the probability that such events
occur, then the underlying types of workplaces who get inspected after observing a
press release may be different than the types inspected without having observed a
press release. If present, such an effect can bias an estimate of the effect of press
releases on compliance conditional on inspection.16
To illustrate this argument more formally, suppose we are interested in using the
number of violations of OSHA standards Vi as a metric of workplace i's compliance,
but the econometrician only observes violations conditional on an inspection being
opened, Vi|Ii = 1. Denote Di as a dummy equal to 1 if workplace i has been exposed
to a press release (Treatment), and equal to 0 otherwise (Control), and suppose
16This effect is similar to the Conditional-on-Positive bias discussed in Angrist and Pischke (2009).
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that exposure to a press release is randomly assigned. Using the potential outcomes
framework, denote V 1i as violations if i is treated, and V
0
i as violations if i is a control.
If we could measure compliance for everyone, then by random assignment of Di
comparing violations at Treatments and Controls estimates the Average Treatment
Effect of press releases on the Treatment Group:
E(V 1i |Di = 1)− E(V 0i |Di = 0) = E(V 1i − V 0i |Di = 1) (1.1)
However, because we do not observe Vi for non-inspected workplaces, we cannot
directly estimate Equation 1.1. A possible alternative is to estimate the treatment
effect on the number of violations cited by OSHA, which captures the effect on both
underlying compliance, and also the likelihood an inspection is opened:
= E[V 1i |Di = 1, Ii = 1]Pr(Ii = 1|Di = 1)− E[V 0i |Di = 0, Ii = 1]Pr(Ii = 1|Di = 0)
=
[
Pr(Ii = 1|Di = 1)− Pr(Ii = 1|Di = 0)
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
participation effect
∗(E[V 1i |Ii = 1, Di = 1])
− (E[V 1i |Ii = 1, Di = 1]− E[V 0i |Ii = 1, Di = 0])︸ ︷︷ ︸
Conditional on Inspection (COI) effect
∗Pr(Ii = 1|Di = 0) (1.2)
The difference in the number of violations found between those who have and
have not observed a press release has two components: the first term of Equation 1.2
which gives the difference in the probability an inspection is initiated (participation
effect), and the difference in mean violations conditional on inspection ( Conditional
on Inspection (COI) effect).
These effects can be estimated separately. The participation effect can be esti-
mated directly by the difference in inspection rates between Treatment and Control
workplaces. A priori the direction of the participation effect is ambiguous. On the
one hand, if the publicity from a press release causes a workplace to improve its
true state of compliance, then a press release may reduce the likelihood of an acci-
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dent, complaint, or other event leading to an endogenous OSHA inspection. On the
other hand, reading a press releases could empower employees to complain to OSHA
when they otherwise would not, leading to more endogenous OSHA inspections.. For
pre-planned programmed inspections, the onset of these inspections are essentially
exogenous to the workplace's activity, and the effect for these types of inspections
should unambiguously be zero.
The COI effect can be estimated by comparing the number of violations found
at future inspections of Treatment and Control workplaces. However, the COI effect
may be plagued by selection bias if treatment affects the types of workplaces which
get inspectedin other words, if the participation effect is not zero. To see this, the
COI effect can be further decomposed into two parts:
E[V 1i |Ii = 1, Di = 1]− E[V 0i |Ii = 1, Di = 0]
= E(V 1i − V 0i |Di = 1, Ii = 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
causal effect
+E(V 0i |Di = 1, Ii = 1)− E(V 0i |Di = 0, Ii = 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
selection bias
The first term of the COI is a causal effect on Treatments who get inspected.
However, the second term is a form of selection bias: the difference in V 0i (i's com-
pliance in the absence of treatment) between Treatment and Control workplaces who
are inspected. For example, if observing a press releases causes extremely danger-
ous workplaces (with the highest V 0i ) to improve safety hazards, thus reducing the
likelihood of a catastrophe inspection, then Treatment workplaces with the highest
V 0i are not inspected, making the second term negative. In other words, if treatment
changes the composition of who gets inspected, the COI effect does not have a causal
interpretationeven if observing a press release is randomly assigned.
This discussion is not to say all hope is lost identifying the effects of press releases
on workplaces' compliance: there are two reasons the COI may yield a valid estimate
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of the causal effect of interest. Firstly, we can estimate the COI effect restricting
attention to programmed inspections, which are part of broader emphasis programs
and pre-plannned by OSHA, and thus very unlikely to be endogenous to observing a
press release. Secondly, if the participation effect is estimated to be zero, we can be
confident the selection bias term of the COI effect with no sample restrictions is not
a practical concern.
1.4.2 RD Method
OSHA'S policy to issue a press release about the violations found in an inspection if it
results in penalties above a cutoff c, where c = $45, 000 for Regions 5,7,8 and $40, 000
for all other regions, provides an opportunity to estimate the effects of these press
releases using regression discontinuity (RD) designprovided certain identification
assumptions are met.
Suppose we are interested in the effect of a press release on some outcome for a
workplace that is publicized in a press release. Whether the workplace is the subject
of a press release is a function of the penalty issued at an OSHA inspectionor the
running variable in RD jargon. Because penalties may also have their own direct
effect on later outcomes, such as later OSHA compliance, it is important to control
flexibly for the running variable to isolate the effects of the press release.
Suppose workplace i has an inspection with penalties levied at date t amounting
to Penit, and we are interested in an outcome observed at a date τ . It is most natural
to re-orient a workplace's inspection history around the focal inspection at date t
the following way:
Yitτ = α + γDit + f(Pit − c) + itτ (1.3)
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Where
Pit = penalty levied at i at time t
Dit = 1{Pit ≥ c}
with f(·) a functional form to be determined, and γ the treatment effect of a press
release which, since we are controlling flexibly for financial penalty, is identified from
variation on those penalties just below and just above the cutoff c.
To estimate the participation effect (effect on the probability a future inspection
is initiated), we can drop the τ subscript and let Yit be the number of any, com-
plaint, or catastrophe inspections of i in the 36 months following date t. To estimate
the effects of a press release on compliance conditional on a future inspection, Yitτ
is a function of measured compliance (such as violations or penalties) levied at an
inspection of i opened at time τ , where τ > t.
Estimating the spillover effects of a press release on non-publicized employers
requires a slightly more nuanced specification. In this setting, the running variable
for a workplace i, which determines whether i is exposed to a press release, may
correspond to a penalty levied at an inspection of i, or at another workplace in i's
peer group. If there are several workplaces in the same peer group inspected in close
succession, the choice of which inspection to use as the running variable can quickly
become subjective. For the estimation, I adapt Equation 1.3 the following way:
Yijt = α +Djtγ + f(P
max
jtτ − c) + ijtτ (1.4)
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Where Yijτ is an outcome for workplace i in peer group j at time τ , and
Pmaxjtτ = max
i′∈j
t∈[May2009,τ)
{penalty cited against i', levied at time t}
Djt = 1{Pjtτ ≥ c}
In words, Pmaxjtτ is the largest penalty issued at any workplace in a peer group
prior to the current date, and Djt switches to 1 as soon as one workplace in group j
has penalties issued exceeding the threshold c and remains at 1 for the remainder of
the sample period. γ is is treatment effect of being exposed to a press release, either
about oneself or about one's peer. To estimate the effect of press releases on the
probability of future OSHA inspections, we omit the i and τ subscripts and let Yjt
be the number of inspections of workplaces in group j after date t, as long as Pmaxjtτ
remains unchanged. To estimate the effect on compliance conditional on inspection,
Yijtτ is a function of violations found or penalties assessed from an inspection of
workplace i in group j at time τ . Robust standard errors are clustered at the peer
group j level.17
A note about this specification of peer groups is it makes no distinction between
the workplace responsible for Pmaxjtτ and the other workplaces in the same peer group;
Pmaxjtτ is the same for all members of a peer group. Thus, to estimate the spillover
17An alternative specification to Equation 1.4 could be, for a given inspection at any member of
peer group j at time t, to re-orient the inspection history of all workplaces in group j around this
focal inspection:
Yijtτ = α+ γDjt + f(Pjt − c) + ijtτ (1.5)
Where Yijtτ is an outcome for workplace i in peer group j at date τ > t, and
Pjt = penalty levied at an inspection of anyi ∈ j at time t
Djt = 1{Pjt ≥ c}
However, one drawback of this specification is that, for peer groups with multiple inspections in
close succession, the number of focal inspections can get arbitrarily large and observations will be
repeated. For this reason, Equation 1.4 is used as the baseline specification, though this model is
used as a robustness check.
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effects of press releases, all specifications remove the workplace responsible for Pmaxjtτ .
For simplicity, baseline specifications use a uniform kernel around the forcing
variable (i.e. observations just at the cutoff and observations further away from the
cutoff get equal weight), though robustness checks consider alternatives. Finally,
because OSHA regions varied in their adherence to the press release cutoff rule, and
because the construction industry has its own set of OSHA standards not applicable
to other industries, we include a dummy variable for each OSHA region and a dummy
variable for construction in all regressions.
Various strategies exist to approximate functional form of f(·). However, Hahn
et al (2001) show that local linear regressionthat is, estimating a standard linear
regression restricted to a narrow bandwidth around the cutoff point cis a non-
parametric way to obtain an unbiased estimate of the treatment effect τ . To im-
plement the local linear regression, we will estimate Equation 1.3 locally around the
cutoff c specifying f(·) as a linear function but allowing for different slopes on each
side of the penalty cutoff c.
1.4.3 Checking the Validity of RD Design
The RD design rests on the assumption that whether inspected workplaces end up just
above or just below the relevant cutoff for press releases is random. This assumption
is valid if those involved have imperfect control over the exact penalty amount issued,
and it can be jeopardized if there is room for manipulation. For example, if there
are reputational costs to publicity about poor safety, the disutility from penalties is
discontinuous at the cutoff c, and if managers know the value of c they may prefer to
bunch just below it.
However, it is ex ante unlikely that managers have the potential to manipulate
whether they are just above or just below the cutoff. First, the cutoff rule was not
announced publicly, so managers were likely unaware of the cutoff to begin with.
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Furthermore, much evidence suggests penalties levied by an OSHA inspector are a
stochastic function of true noncompliance. For example, different OSHA inspectors
may have varying degrees of toughness, and not every OSHA standard is checked at
every inspection, and standards have been refined or eliminated over time (Weil 1996).
The stochastic element of the penalty function introduces an element of randomness
from the workplace's perspective, which would limit its ability to control the exact
penalty given a level of true noncompliance.
On the other hand, there is entirely room for manipulation by the OSHA inspec-
tors, since they issue violations and associated penalties themselves. For example, an
inspector could tip the employer over the penalty cutoff if she thinks it is poorly run
and deserves bad publicity, or in theory she could accept a bribe to leave penalties just
below. OSHA officials have confirmed that the method inspectors use to determine
penalties is very mechanical, and that any notion of whether the employer is above
or below the press release cutoff never enters into the equation. However, it is still
necessary to determine whether this lack of manipulation appears true quantitatively.
One test of the validity is whether the density of penalties associated with inspec-
tions is smooth around the cutoff c. If there is a discontinuity in the aggregate density
at the cutoff, then one may suspect either workplaces or inspectors are manipulating
penalty amounts to be on one side or the other. Figure 1·4 examines the density
around the cutoff visually. Penalty amounts are normalized by the corresponding
regional cutoff c and are placed in equally sized bins of $2500 (with care to ensure
all bins are on only one side of each cutoff), and frequencies are calculated for each
bin. The sample is restricted to inspections during May 2009-Dec 2011. The density
appears overall quite smooth, and implementing the test proposed by McCrary (2008)
confirms no statistically significant change in the density at the cutoff.
A second test of the validity of the imprecise control assumption is whether
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relevant baseline characteristics are smooth around the cutoff. Table 1.2 shows the
results of local linear regressions, estimating Equation 1.3, with τ = 0 and Yitτ equal
to one of various baseline covariates measured at the time of the focal inspection,
using a window of $10,000 around the cutoff c. The results show no evidence of
a discontinuity in any covariates, providing further support that the assumptions
needed for identification using the RD design are met. 18
1.5 The Effects of Publicizing Violations on Future Compli-
ance
1.5.1 Direct Effect on Publicized Employers
While the primary goal of this paper is to estimate the effects of publicizing OSHA
violations on the future compliance decisions of non-publicized workplaces, we first
briefly consider the effects of OSHA press releases on the compliance of the publi-
cized workplace (specific deterrence). One complication is that measuring specific
deterrence is not a completely straightforward task in this setting, particularly for
construction. The concept of a workplace is ill-defined in construction: if OSHA
issues penalties to a construction contractor at one work site, the next time OSHA
inspects that contractor may be at a completely different worksite, making it both
conceptually and practically challenging to create a workplace identifier for inspec-
tions in this industry. The task is more straightforward for non-construction: for
example, a manufacturing plant stays in one place, and neatly fits the concept of an
establishment and is relatively easy to track across repeat inspections. However,
because construction makes up over half the sample of inspections near the cutoff,
18An alternative way to check for smoothness in baseline covariates is to run a regression with
Dit as the dependent variable, and include each baseline covariate as a righthand side variable, and
conduct an F-test that coefficients on all baseline covariates are equal to zero. The results of this
specification, not shown in the paper, yield an F-stat of 0.23 and p-value of 0.97, further evidence
that baseline covariates show no discotninuties around the cutoff.
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the difficulties surrounding construction will reduce power in this analysis.
As described in Section 2.4, we first evaluate the effect of press releases on the
probability of future inspection and then turn to their effect on compliance condi-
tional on future inspection. Figure A.0.1 displays graphical results for the number
of later inspections: it again places workplaces into equally sized bins based on the
penalty in the focal inspection, and plots the number of later inspections for each
workplace. Panel (a) plots number of later complaint, referral or catastrophe inspec-
tions (more endogeneous to conditions at the workplace), and panel (b) plots number
of programmed or follow-up inspections (less endogeneous to conditions at the work-
place). Panel (a) appears to show a drop in the number of future inspections triggered
by a complaint, referral or accident for workplaces with a penalty just to the right
of the cutoff, while Panel (b) shows no sign of any difference in rates of future other
inspections.
Columns (1)-(2) of Table 1.3 display corresponding regression results. These re-
gressions estimate Equation 1.3 with Yit equal to the number of inspections at i
following its inspection with penalties levied at time t over the next 36 months. All
regressions are Intent to Treat (ITT) analysis, in which we compare outcomes of those
above and below the press release cutoff, irrespective of whether a press release is ac-
tually issued. Column 1 shows that workplaces just above the press release cutoff
are estimated to have 0.085 fewer complaint, referral or accident inspections, which is
over 60 percent of the Control mean, though the result is not statistically significant
(p=.15). The estimate for other inspections is tiny and nowhere near significant.
We next turn to effects of press releases on compliance conditional on inspection.
Because the results above show Treatments may have fewer endogeneous inspections,
these results restrict to compliance conditional on later non-complaint, -referral or
-accident inspections. Figure A.0.2 displays the plots for violations and penalties
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levied at later inspections and show no sign of a discontinuous jump in either one at
the cutoff. Columns (4)-(5) of Table 1.3 display the regression results for compliance
conditional on future inspection, implementing Equation 1.3, for violation counts and
for log of financial penalties. The point estimates are quite noisy and are drawn from
quite a small sample, thus are relatively uninformative.
1.5.2 Spillover Effects on Other Employers
This section investigates the deterrence effects of a press release on the compliance
of all other employers in the publicized employer's peer group. Figure A.0.3 plots
whether a press release affects the number of future inspections at other employers in
the publicized employer's peer group. Each peer group is placed into a bin, where now
the running variable corresponds to the peer group focal penalty Pmaxjtτ , and average
values of each dependent variable are calculated for each bin, where the dependent
variable is the number of inspections in the three years following the issuance date
of the focal penalty. Each graph shows no sign of a discontinuity in the number of
inspections in a peer group at the cutoff.
Intent-to-treat (ITT) regression results for these deterrence effects are shown in
Table 1.4 using a bandwidth of $10,000 around the cutoff and controlling linearly for
the running variable. Columns (1)-(3) show that peer groups in which one member's
inspection yielded penalties just above the press release cutoff are not inspected at a
significantly different rate than groups with a member yielding penalties just below
the cutoff. While the imprecision of the estimates means large effects cannot be
ruled out, the combination of the graphical results and lack of statistical significance
suggests selection bias in the estimates of the effect conditional on future inspection
is not a first order concern.
Graphical representation of the effects of press releases on compliance conditional
on inspection is shown in Figure 1·5. Panels (a) and (b) consider number of total
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violations and value of initial penalties, respectively, and Panels (c) and (d) restrict
to programmed inspections. Each of the four graphs depicts a clear downward shift
in violations or penalties among employers in a peer group just to the right of the
cutoff c, suggesting employers exposed to a press release about a peer significantly
improve their compliance with OSHA regulations.
Columns (4)-(5) of Table 1.4 show the baseline regression results for compliance
conditional on inspection. Inspections of employers in peer groups in which the largest
penalty received by one of its member is above the press release cutoff have signifi-
cantly fewer violations and lower financial penalties than those groups in which the
largest penalty is below the cutoff. Having observed a press release (in an ITT sense)
leads to 43% fewer violations (-1.13/2.64=43%) , and 39% lower penalties (exp(-0.5)-
1).
Columns (6) and (7) explore temporal effects of press releases, estimating the
effects on compliance change over time. 19 Effects show up immediately and appear
to increase in magnitude through three years after a press release is issued.
Table 1.5 explores how the spillover effects change as a function of distance to the
publicized employer. The columns vary the geographic grouping of peer groups from
county (wider) to 5-digit zip (narrower), and the rows vary the industry grouping
from no industry distinction, NAICS sector, and 3-digit NAICS. Using zipcode as
the geographic group, moving from the baseline grouping of 2-digit NAICS sector
to narrower 3 digit industries yields essentially identical results, while removing the
industry grouping altogether shrinks the magnitude by almost half. Interestingly,
moving from 5-digit zip to county also shrinks the magnitude by about half, suggesting
that both geographic and industrial proximity matter for the spillover effects of press
releases.
19These regressions utilize a a variant of Equation 1.4 of the form Yijtτ =
(∑
k αk + Djtkτk
)
+
f(Pmaxjtτ − c) + ijtτ , k = {τ − t ∈ {0− 6}, τ − t ∈ {7− 12}, τ − t ∈ {13− 24}, τ − t ∈ {25− 36}}
months.
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1.6 Checks on Validity of Spillover Effect Results
1.6.1 Robustness checks
Next, we do several robustness checks on the primary specification. Table 1.6 illus-
trates some of these checks.
While Columns 1-3 of Table 1.4 showed no evidence that press releases significantly
affect the composition of who gets inspected, we may still be worried about the
selection bias on the Conditional on Inspection (COI) effects discussed in Section 2.4.
Column 1 of Table 1.6 restricts the sample to programmed inspections. Since these
inspections are pre-planned by OSHA and typically part of larger emphasis programs,
there is little scope for them to be endogenous to media coverage. The point estimate
reduces slightly in magnitude but the effect size relative to the Control Mean is almost
identical to the baseline result.
Column (2) includes a few potentially relevant baseline controls, which RD as-
sumptions require to be uncorrelated with treatment, but whose inclusion may im-
prove efficiency. The assumption appears to be met, as the point estimates are nearly
identical to the baseline.
Columns (3)-(6) use variants of a slightly different specification for the running
variable, described in Footnote 17. Column 3 restricts attention to running variables
Pjt which are a peer group j's first penalty levied at any member of j in the sample
period above $20,000, and Column 4 restrictions attention to running variables which
are the maximum penalty levied in a peer group in the sample period, and Column
5 makes all penalties eligible. Results are remarkably unchanged from the baseline
specification.
Two pieces of evidence provide assurance that the results are not sensitive to my
specification choice, including window around the cutoff c and linear polynomial in
the running variable Pjt. Firstly, I implement the procedure outlined in Calonico,
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Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2014) to optimally select the bandwidth, polynomial order,
and confidence intervals for robust inference in an RD design, using the rdrobust
Stata package made available by the authors. Results are shown in Table A.0.1.
Based on the procedure in Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2014), a bandwidth
of $11,603 is chosen around the cutoff c when the dependent variable is Violation
Count, and $12,686 when the dependent variable is log(penalties), both of which are
very close to the bandwidth of $10,000 used in the baseline results, and a triangular
kernel around c is used, which gives more weight to observations closer to c, instead
of a uniform kernel. The magnitudes of the treated coefficient decrease slightly in
magnitude compared to baseline but remain highly significant.
Secondly, Table A.0.3 investigates the sensitivity of the results to varying the win-
dow around the cutoff c and the functional form of the running variable. The baseline
results are remarkably consistent across the different specifications considered.
Overall, the robustness tests provide credibility to the baseline results.
1.6.2 Placebo Tests
We run two placebo tests to validate the causal interpretation of the above results.
Firstly, we re-run the regressions corresponding to Equation 1.4 but replacing the
true cutoff c with a series of placebo meaningless cutoffs. If we found a significant
coefficient using any of these meaningless cutoffs, we would worry the above significant
estimates are spurious. The results are shown in Table 1.7. Using all cutoffs other
than the true press release cutoff, the estimated coefficient is tiny and statistically
indistinguishable from zero.
We run a second placebo test to ensure the results are not driven by some other
factor that switches on at penalty amounts exceeding $40,000 or $45,000. Recall
that while Regions 1 and 4 had adopted the $40,000 cutoff several years before 2009,
all other regions had been using either a significantly higher cutoff or none at all. If
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we run the regression corresponding to Equation 1.4 but oriented around inspections
with penalties levied before May 2009, we should expect a significant γ for Regions
1 and 4, but zero for all others. Furthermore, recall the press release policy was only
implemented in the states under the jurisdiction of OSHA's federal office, and not in
the 21 states with approved state plans. Running Equation 1.4 for state plan states
should yield a γ = 0 for both the pre- and post-2009 periods.
Panel 1 of Table 1.8 reports the results of these regressions. Columns (1), (3) and
(5) report the first stage results (using Equation 1.3, restricted to penalties issued
Jan 2002-Dec 2008) and confirm that, in the years preceding 2009, Pr(press release)
significantly jumped at the cutoff of $40,000 in Regions 1 and 4, but not other regions
and not in state-plan states. Columns (2), (4) and (6) estimate the spillover regression
among peer groups whose running variable Pmaxjtτ is restricted to be between Jan 2002-
Dec 2008. Effects in Regions 1 and 4 are quite similar to the baseline results for all
regions in the post-2009 period and, reassuringly, no effect is found in other regions
nor in state-plan states.
Panel 2 reports results from the same regressions but for the post-2009 period
considered in the baseline regressions. Pr(Press Release) now significantly jumps at
the cutoff for all federally-run regions but, interestingly, the effect on compliance
vanishes for Regions 1 and 4. One explanation for this could be that, as the cumula-
tive number of press releases written up in an area increases, the marginal effect of
an additional press releases on compliance diminishes. For example, if the primary
mechanism through which press releases affect compliance is their effect on a firm's
reputation, then press releases issued at the onset of the policy may significantly in-
crease the perceived threat of negative media exposure, but after a while an additional
press release does little to change the perceived threat. Alternatively, if press releases
affect compliance by making safety concerns or OSHA enforcement more salient to
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managers, a press release's marginal effect on salience may also decline over time.
Again, reassuringly, there is no effect in the state-plan states.
1.7 Deterrence Effects: Reputation or Salience?
This section considers mechanisms that could be driving the observed deterrence
effects of press releases on the compliance of peer employers.
As described in Section 1.2, one potential mechanism is that publicity about safety
violations damages an employer's reputation, and employers improve their compliance
following a press release about a peer as a preemptive investment to avoid their own
negative publicity. In other words, publicity imposes an additional cost to OSHA
violations, above and beyond financial penalties levied by OSHA. Indeed, since press
releases were often covered by local newspapers and industry trade publications, a
press release about an employer could be seen by its consumers, potential new work-
ers, up/downstream firms, and competitors, and each of these stakeholders may value
attention to workplace safety for a variety of reasons (as described in Section 1.2).
In this story, press releases incentivize employers to improve compliance for the sole
purpose of avoiding their own press release in the future. As a result, issuing press
releases about violations should only affect compliance decisions when expected penal-
ties lie in a neighborhood around the press release cutoff, and should have no effect
on compliance at the tails of the penalty distribution. This argument is fleshed out
below.
Consider an employer who learns OSHA has begun publicizing employers found
with many violations and cited with large penalties. The employer may not know the
exact value of the cutoff rule used by OSHA for issuing press releases, but may infer
a rough sense of it, for example by viewing other press releases OSHA has already
issued. If the employer is in almost perfect compliance, with expected penalties
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sufficiently below the cutoff, the chance of receiving penalties resulting in a press
release are low.Thus, the marginal benefit of improving to perfect compliance is very
small, as it relates to the probability of bad publicity. If improving compliance is
costly, we would not expect this employer to change its state of compliance.
Consider another employer at the other tail of the compliance distribution egre-
giously out of compliance with expected penalties well above the cutoff, which will
face penalties far higher than the (perceived) press release cutoff if inspected. Such an
employer would have to dramatically improve compliance to even moderately reduce
the chance of having its violations publicized, and if the cost of remediating violations
is costly, we would also not expect this employer to change its state of compliance.
Finally, consider an employer whose level of non-compliance is in a neighborhood
around the (perceived) press release cutoff. For such an employer, small improvements
in compliance can have large benefits in expectation by decreasing the chance of a
press release. As a result, we would expect employers to actively avoid receiving
penalties in a neighborhood around the cutoff and improve compliance enough so
that expected penalties is sufficiently to the left of the press release cutoff. Note
we would not expect this employer to necessarily improve to perfect compliance,
but rather just enough to avoid the chance of a press release. Of course, if employers
knew the precise value of the press release cutoff (and the cutoff was a sharp one), and
employers could perfectly control the penalties they would receive in an inspection,
we would expect employers to bunch just to the left of the cutoff, but reasons already
discussed in Section 2.4 suggest this situation is very unlikely.
Thus, the reputation deterrence story yields a clear empirical prediction: The
introduction of the press release policy should result in little to no improvements in
compliance in the tails of the distribution of OSHA penalties, but should lead to a
leftward shift in mass from a neighborhood around the press release cutoff. Figure 1·6
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tests this prediction. It plots the distribution of penalties for all inspections opened
in 2008 in states under federal OSHA jurisdiction, separately for Regions 1 and 4
(which had been using a $40,000 cutoff to issue press releases since at least 2000) and
Regions 5,6,7 and 8, which did not begin using a $40,000 (or $45,000) cutoff until
2009, using a kernel density estimation. The top panel of the figure plots the part
of the distribution with penalties between $0 and $10,000, encompassing the left tail
of the distribution nowhere near the $40,000 cutoff being used in Regions 1 and 4
during this period, and the bottom panel plots the part of the distribution between
$20,000 and $100,000, encompassing the area surrounding the $40,000 cutoff and the
right tail (the mass beyond $100,000 is minuscule and thus omitted). At the left end
of the distribution, there is no evidence that employers in Regions 1 and 4 improved
their compliance relative to those in other regions: if anything, the distribution is
shifted toward slightly worse compliance. On the other hand, the right panel depicts
a clear leftward shift in the mass away from the area just surrounding the cutoff,
while showing no change in the right tail.
While the changes in the distribution of penalties supports the reputation deter-
rence story, it does not rule out alternative mechanisms. The primary alternative
mechanism that could explain the spillover effects, described in Section 1.2, is reading
a press release about an inspection of one's peer could change other employers' beliefs
about the probability of OSHA enforcement (enforcement deterrence) in two ways.
One way is updating beliefs about the probability of enforcement, either through the
probability of inspection or the expected fine conditional on inspection. If press re-
leases were informing employers OSHA was active in their region and sector, then we
would expect a larger effect in areas with low OSHA activity in the years prior to the
introduction of the press release policy.
A second way a press release could change employers' beliefs about OSHA enforce-
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ment is by beliefs over the priorities of enforcement: because press releases provide
detailed descriptions of the specific violations found in an inspection, and the penalty
associated with each violation, a press release could signal that OSHA is cracking
down on a particular set of regulations. Under this story, we would expect peers of
a publicized employer to improve compliance with the regulations violated by the
publicized employer, relative to other OSHA regulations.
These predictions of the enforcement deterrence story are tested in Table 1.9.
The first four columns investigate how the spillover effects of press releases differ by
baseline OSHA enforcement. For each peer group, I calculate the number of OSHA
inspections occurring between 2005 and 2008, and the median penalty conditional on
inspections between 2005 and 2008. For each measure, I split the sample into high
baseline enforcement and low baseline enforcement peer groups based on whether
a peer group lies above or below the median. For both measures of enforcement, the
results are essentially identical for low and high enforcement groups, providing no
evidence that spillover effects operate through updating beliefs about the probability
of enforcement.
Columns 5-6 investigate whether the spillover effects are driven by updating beliefs
over the priorities of OSHA enforcement. For each peer group, I identify the set of
OSHA regulations violated in the focal inspection responsible for the running variable
Pmax, and I calculate the number of focal and non-focal violations. If anything,
there is a larger drop in non-focal violations, providing no evidence that spillover
effects operate through updating beliefs about the priorities of enforcement.
Overall, these results suggest the observed responsiveness of compliance to press
releases is due to employers acting to preserve harm to their reputation, rather than
updating their beliefs regarding OSHA enforcement.
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1.8 Conclusion
While a growing literature has found evidence that providing information about firms'
quality leads to quality improvements, less is understood about the deterrence effects
of information provision on non-publicized firms. This paper provided robust, quasi-
experimental evidence that publicizing employers which violate safety and health
regulations leads to significantly higher compliance with those regulations among
other employers most likely exposed to the publicity. Furthermore, the evidence
overwhelmingly suggests the observed responses are due to employers making defen-
sive investments to avoid their own publicity, rather than using the information to
update their beliefs about the probability and severity of regulatory enforcement. On
the other hand, the paper did not find that shaming led publicized employers to
improve their compliance: while these results may suggest that shaming has asym-
metric direct and deterrence effects, the imprecision of the estimated direct effects
due to the small sample size makes it difficult to credibly interpret the direct effects.
This imprecision is one of the limitations of the paper, and is an important direction
for future research.
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Table 1.1: Summary Statistics
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All inspections Penalties within
10,000 of PR cutoff
Panel A: Summary Stastics Var. Var.
mean SD mean SD
Compliance measures
number of violations 2.58 ( 3.56) 10.59 ( 6.46)
initial penalties 4497.60 ( 7644.17) 36613.27 ( 7889.61)
Initial penalties ≥ Press Release cutoff 0.01 ( 0.12) 0.28 ( 0.45)
Workplace characteristics
Number of employees 60.71 ( 190.67) 127.36 ( 278.38)
union present 0.10 ( 0.30) 0.15 ( 0.35)
Panel B: Summary Indicators Var. % of Var. % of
count total count total
Type of Inspection
complaint inspection 18248 19.8% 261 27.1%
Referral inspection 10499 11.4% 174 18.1%
fatality or catastrophe inspection 2011 2.2% 60 6.2%
programmed inspection 55821 60.5% 413 42.9%
Other inspections 5791 6.3% 60 6.2%
Industry
Ag, forestry, fishing 549 0.6% 6 0.6%
Utilities 377 0.4% 6 0.6%
Construction 54834 59.5% 324 33.7%
Manufacturing 20351 22.1% 446 46.4%
Wholesale Trade 2893 3.1% 50 5.2%
Retail Trade 2142 2.3% 19 2.0%
Transportation, Warehousing 2715 2.9% 30 3.1%
Services 8374 9.1% 81 8.4%
Number of inspections 92235 962
The sample in Columns (1) and (2) includes all inspections opened Jan 2009-Dec 2011
in states under the juristiction of federal OSHA. The subsample in Columns (3) and
(4) consists of all inspections which have penalties issued within the given bandwidth
of the relevant press release cutoff, and exclude Regions 2 or 3.
Inspections classified as Other include follow-up, monitoring, variance, and other.
For OSHA regions 5, 7 and 8, the relevant press release cutoff is 45,000, and for all
others it is 40,000.
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Table 1.2: Smoothness of covariates around press release cutoff
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Press Comp- Ref- Fat- ln union # prior # prior
Release laint erral Cat (emp) present inspec- viol-
issued Insp Insp Insp tions ations
Penalty≥ c 0.19 0.023 -0.037 0.0070 0.11 0.0055 0.13 -0.25
(0.052)** (0.062) (0.048) (0.039) (0.20) (0.045) (0.21) (1.31)
Obs 921 921 921 921 921 921 921 921
Obs Pen≥ c 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291
Obs Pen< c 630 630 630 630 630 630 630 630
Control Mean 0.065 0.28 0.15 0.067 3.40 0.13 0.65 4.23
The sample is restricted to inspections with penalties issued between May 2009-Dec 2011. All
specifications use a window around the PR cutoff of 10,000.
The coefficients estimate the magnitude of the change in the dependent variable for inspections
with penalties issued at the press release cutoff. Each coefficient is estimated in a separate
regression which controls linearly for penalty with different slopes on each side of the cutoff.
Robust standard errors, in parentehses, clustered at initial penalty. +P<.1, *P<.05, **P<.01.
For OSHA regions 5, 7 and 8, the relevant cutoff is 45,000, and for all others it is 40,000.
Count variables topcoded at 99th percentiles.
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Table 1.3: The Effect of a Press Release on Future Inspections and Compliance of
the Publicized Employer
(1) (2) (3) (4)
probability of inspection compliance conditional on
(non-complaint, -referral,
or -accident) inspection
# complaint, # ln(Initial # Total
referral, other Penalties) violations
or accident insps
insps
Post inspection with Penalty≥ c -0.085 0.033 -0.61 -1.93
(0.059) (0.049) (0.94) (1.67)
Obs 921 921 148 148
Obs Pen≥ c 291 291 45 45
Obs Pen< c 630 630 103 103
Control Mean 0.14 0.15 6.29 2.01
For columns (1)-(2), the sample includes all workplaces with (focal) inspections with
penalties issued between May 2009-Dec 2011 resulting in penalties within 10,000 of the
press release cutoff. The dependent variables are equal to the number of subsequent
inspections of the corresponding type of the workplace within 3 years of the focal date
through June 2013.
For the remaining columns, the sample includes all programmed and follow-up inspec-
tions within 3 years following the date penalties are issued in the focal inspection, and
through June 2013.
The coefficients estimate the magnitude of the change in the dependent variable when
penalties from the focal inspection just exceed the press release cutoff. Each coefficient is
estimated in a separate regression which controls linearly for penalty at focal inspection
with different slopes on each side of the cutoff. Each regression includes a construction
dummy, a dummy equal to 1 if the penalty was issued after May 2009, and region fixed
effects. Robust standard errors clustered by workplace +P<.1, *P<.05, **P<.01.
Inspections in Column 1 include Complaint and referrals, those triggered by an allegation
made to OSHA of safety or health hazards at an employer by an employee, and inspector,
media report, or government agency, respectively.
Inspections in Column 2 are all other types of inspections: programmed inspections,
follow-up inspections, and a small percentage of other types of inspections. Programmed
inspections are initiated based on a broad OSHA emphasis program and are independent
of activity at the workplace, and follow-up inspections occur to assess an employer's
compliance with violations cited at a previous inspection.
For OSHA regions 5, 7 and 8, the relevant cutoff is 45,000, and for all others it is 40,000.
Count variables topcoded at 99th percentiles.
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Table 1.4: The effect of a press release on compliance of all other employers in the
publicized employers's peer group
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Pr(inspection) conditional on inspection
(unit of analysis (unit of analysis
=peer group) =inspection)
# total # complaint, # # ln(pen- # ln(pen-
inspect- referral, other viols alties) viols alties)
ions or accident insps
insps
Post inspection of peer with penalty≥ c 0.54 -0.30 0.85 -1.13 -0.50
(1.01) (0.45) (0.77) (0.32)** (0.22)*
0-6 months post penalty≥ c -0.93 -0.53
(0.35)** (0.24)*
6-12 months post penalty≥ c -0.96 -0.50
(0.40)* (0.24)*
12-24 months post penalty≥ c -1.35 -0.58
(0.35)** (0.23)*
24-36 months post penalty≥ c -1.38 -0.77
(0.42)** (0.32)*
Obs 753 753 753 3456 3456 3456 3456
obs Pen≥ c 249 249 249 1234 1234 1234 1234
obs Pen< c 504 504 504 2222 2222 2222 2222
Control Mean 4.41 1.49 2.91 2.64 7.43 2.64 7.43
Peer groups are defined as all workplaces sharing the same industry and zip code. All regressions use a bandwidth
around the press release cutoff of 10,000 and include a construction dummy and focal year and region fixed effects.
The running variable is the largest penalty issued in a peer group between May 2009 and the previous month. All
regressions exclude the employer responsible for the focal penalty. The sample period is restricted to June 2009-Dec
2012 and to peer groups whose running variable is between May 2009 and Dec 2011. Regions 2 and 3 not included.
Each coefficient is estimated in a separate regression which controls linearly for P(max) with different slopes on each
side of the cutoff. Robust standard errors clustered by peer group +P<.1, *P<.05, **P<.01.
For OSHA regions 5, 7 and 8, the relevant cutoff is 45,000, and for all others it is 40,000. Count variables topcoded
at 99th percentiles, logged variables add the first non-zero percentile to accommodate zeroes.
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Table 1.5: Spillover effects of a press release attenuate with distance to publicized
workplace
(1) (2)
Geographic Group
county zip code
Industry Group
All industries -0.29 -0.62
(0.38) (0.24)*
Obs 4954 6852
Control Mean 2.56 2.53
2-digit NAICS sector -0.53 -1.12
(0.27)* (0.32)**
Obs 6705 3456
Control Mean 2.76 2.64
3-digit NAICS -0.43 -0.92
(0.27) (0.36)*
Obs 4761 1575
Control Mean 2.61 2.19
The dependent variable is the number of vi-
olations in an inspection. All regressions use
a bandwidth around the press release cutoff
of 10,000 and include a construction dummy
and focal year and region fixed effects. The
running variable is the largest penalty issued
in a peer group between May 2009 and the
previous month. The sample period is re-
stricted to June 2009-Dec 2012 and to peer
groups whose running variable is between
May 2009 and Dec 2011. Regions 2 and 3
not included.
Each coefficient is estimated in a separate re-
gression which controls linearly for P(max)
with different slopes on each side of the cut-
off. Robust standard errors clustered by peer
group +P<.1, *P<.05, **P<.01.
For OSHA regions 5, 7 and 8, the rele-
vant cutoff is 45,000, and for all others it
is 40,000. Count variables topcoded at 99th
percentiles.
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Table 1.6: Robustness Checks: General deterrence regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
different running vars
Prog- Baseline first P(jt) max P(jt) all P(jt)
rammed controls
only
Post inspection of peer with penalty≥ c -0.95 -1.12 -1.05 -1.01 -0.84
(0.36)** (0.32)** (0.28)** (0.26)** (0.23)**
Obs 2138 3423 3231 3474 4877
Control Mean 2.38 2.62 2.21 2.24 2.29
The Programmed Only specification restricts the sample to programmed (pre-planned) inspections.
Column 2 uses the whole sample but includes controls for the peer group's pre-2009 share of in-
spections with a union present, number employees present at the median inspection, penalty at the
median inspection, and number of inspections.
Columns 3-5 use a slightly different model specification that re-orients all inspections of a peer group
around a focal inspection in the group. In Column 3 the focal inspection is the first inspection in
the peer group with penalties exceeding 20,000. In Column 4 the focal inspection in the inspection
in the group yielding the highest penalties in the sample period. In Column 5, all inspections are
eligible to be focal inspections. See footnote 17 for details.
Peer groups are defined as all workplaces sharing the same industry and zip code. All regressions
use a bandwidth around the press release cutoff of 10,000 and include a construction dummy and
focal year region and industry fixed effects. The running variable is the largest penalty issued in
a peer group between May 2009 and the previous month. The sample period is restricted to June
2009-Dec 2012 and to peer groups whose running variable is between May 2009 and Dec 2011.
Regions 2 and 3 not included.
Each coefficient is estimated in a separate regression which controls linearly for P(max) with different
slopes on each side of the cutoff. Robust standard errors clustered by peer group +P<.1, *P<.05,
**P<.01.
For OSHA regions 5, 7 and 8, the relevant cutoff is 45,000, and for all others it is 40,000. Count
variables topcoded at 99th percentiles.
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Table 1.7: Comparing general deterrence effects using the true Press Release thresh-
old relative to placebo cutoffs
(1) (2) (3) (4)
c=
20k 30k PR 55k
cutoff
Dep Var=# total violations
Post inspection of peer with penalty≥ c 0.15 0.054 -1.13 -0.0032
(0.12) (0.23) (0.32)** (0.33)
Obs 20184 8712 3456 1974
Control Mean 2.30 2.35 2.64 2.38
Dep Var=ln(penalties)
Post inspection of peer with penalty≥ c 0.066 0.029 -0.50 -0.22
(0.085) (0.19) (0.22)* (0.27)
Obs 20184 8712 3456 1974
Control Mean 7.24 7.33 7.43 7.29
Peer groups are defined as all workplaces sharing the same industry and zip
code. All regressions use a bandwidth around the cutoff corresponding to the
respective column of 10,000 and include a construction dummy and focal year
and region fixed effects. The running variable is the largest penalty issued in
a peer group between May 2009 and the previous month. The sample period
is restricted to June 2009-Dec 2012 and to peer groups whose running variable
is between May 2009 and Dec 2011. Regions 2 and 3 not included.
Each coefficient is estimated in a separate regression which controls linearly
for P(max) with different slopes on each side of the cutoff. Robust standard
errors clustered by peer group +P<.1, *P<.05, **P<.01.
For OSHA regions 5, 7 and 8, the relevant cutoff is 45,000, and for all others
it is 40,000. Count variables topcoded at 99th percentiles.
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Table 1.8: Pre- vs. post-2009 regressions comparing a) regions using 40,000 thresh-
old pre-2009, b) regions who began May 2009, and c) state-plan states never with a
cutoff rule
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Regions 1, 4 Regions NOT 1, 4 State Plan States
PR policy in PR policy PR policy never
place 2002 begins 2009 implemented
DV= DV= DV= DV= DV= DV=
Press # Viols Press # Viols Press # Viols
Release (peer Release (peer Release (peer
Issued group) Issued group) Issued group)
Panel A: Running var includes penalties issued 2002-2008, c=40,000
Penalty ≥ c 0.22 -1.33 0.027 0.16 0.023 -0.15
(0.071)** (0.51)** (0.025) (0.31) (0.015) (0.27)
Obs 528 2321 788 4485 350 9839
Control Mean 0.058 3.11 0.014 2.62 0 2.41
Panel B: Running var includes penalties issued 2009-2011, c=PR cutoff
Penalty ≥ c 0.13 -0.13 0.20 -1.74 0.024 0.26
(0.069)+ (0.53) (0.071)** (0.48)** (0.045) (0.44)
Obs 446 1428 506 1681 203 2172
Control Mean 0.037 2.45 0.043 2.87 0 2.31
Columns (1), (3) and (5) report the coefficient on a dummy for Penalty≥ c, where
c is designated in the respective panel, from the regression specification corre-
sponding to Equation 1.3, capturing the first stage relationship between whether
a press release is issued and whether penalties are just above the cutoff.
Columns (2), (4) and (6) report the coefficient on a dummy for P(max)≥ c, where
c is designated in the respective panel, from the regression specification corre-
sponding to Equation 1.4, estimating the spillover effects of press releases on the
compliance of peer employers.
Peer groups are defined as all workplaces sharing the same industry and zip code.
All regressions use a bandwidth around the cutoff corresponding to the respective
column of 10,000 and include a construction dummy and focal year and region
fixed effects. In panel A, the running variable is the largest penalty issued in a
peer group between January 2002 and the previous month, and in Panel B, the
running variable is the largest penalty issued between May 2009 and the previous
month. Regressions restricted to a window of 36 months after the focal date.
Regions 2 and 3 not included.
Each coefficient is estimated in a separate regression which controls linearly for
P(max) with different slopes on each side of the cutoff. Robust standard errors
clustered by peer group +P<.1, *P<.05, **P<.01.
In Panel B, for OSHA regions 5, 7 and 8, the relevant cutoff is 45,000, and for all
others it is 40,000. Count variables topcoded at 99th percentiles.
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Table 1.9: Testing if enforcement deterrence is driving spillover effects of press
releases
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Split sample by peer group's Split violation type by
pre-period Relation to
# inspections Median penalty Focal Inspection
High Low High Low # focal # non-focal
viols viols
Post inspection of peer with penalty≥ c -1.46 -0.78 -0.77 -1.10 -0.23 -0.77
(0.50)** (0.42)+ (0.46)+ (0.45)* (0.24) (0.27)**
Obs 1715 1741 1489 1967 3456 3456
Control Mean 3.04 2.25 2.44 2.78 1.23 1.70
Columns 1-2 take the number of OSHA inspections in a peer group between 2005-2008, and split the
sample into peer groups which are above or below the sample median number of inspections. Columns
3-4 take the median penalty levied over all OSHA inspections in a peer group between 2005-2008, and
split the sample into peer groups which are above or below the sample median.
Columns 5-6 use the full sample, but classify violations by whether they where also violated in a peer
group's focal inspection.
Peer groups are defined as all workplaces sharing the same industry and zip code. All regressions use a
bandwidth around the press release cutoff of 10,000 and include a construction dummy and focal year
and region fixed effects. The running variable is the largest penalty issued in a peer group between
May 2009 and the previous month. The sample period is restricted to June 2009-Dec 2012 and to peer
groups whose running variable is between May 2009 and Dec 2011. Regions 2 and 3 not included.
Each coefficient is estimated in a separate regression which controls linearly for P(max) with different
slopes on each side of the cutoff. Robust standard errors clustered by peer group +P<.1, *P<.05,
**P<.01.
For OSHA regions 5, 7 and 8, the relevant cutoff is 45,000, and for all others it is 40,000. Count
variables topcoded at 99th percentiles.
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Figure 1·1: Example of OSHA press release picked up by local media
Source: Gainesville Times. Accessed March 2014
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Figure 1·2: Press Releases, Media Coverage, and Inspections by Year
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The figure gives the number of press releases about enforcement issued by OSHA
each year, the number of newspaper articles in newslibrary.com mentioning
OSHA in the title and violations anywhere in the text, and finally an index of
the number of inspections, normalized by the number in 2002. each year
2002-2011. The first panel does so for Regions 1 and 4 (using a cutoff of $40,000
for the entire sample period) all other regions ( adopting the cutoff rule for issuing
press releases in 2009).
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Figure 1·3: Probability of a Press Release Jumps at the Cutoff by
25-30 percentage points
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The figure shows the average of an indicator variable equal to one if an inspection
resulted in a press release, ordered by the financial penalties levied at the
inspection. Each dot corresponds to an average over $2,500. The continuous lines
represent quadratic polynomials fitted separately on each side of the cutoff.
Sample period includes inspections with penalties issued May 2009- Dec 2011, and
excludes state-plan states and Regions 2 and 3.
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Figure 1·4: Frequency of Inspections Around Penalty Cutoffs for
Press Release Issuance
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The figure shows the density of the number of inspections, by the financial
penalties levied at the inspection. Each dot plots the number of inspections in a
bin, where bins are defined by $2500 non-overlapping intervals of penalty issued.
Sample period includes inspections with penalties issued May 2009- Dec 2011, and
excludes state-plan states and Regions 2 and 3.
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Figure 1·5: General Deterrence Plots: The Effect of a Press Release
on Subsequent Compliance of all Workplaces in the Same Peer Group
1.
5
2
2.
5
3
−20000 −10000 0 10000 20000
Peer Focal penalty−PR Threshold
Excluding focal employer
Total Violations
40
00
50
00
60
00
70
00
80
00
−20000 −10000 0 10000 20000
Peer Focal penalty−PR Threshold
Excluding focal employer
Initial Penalties
1.
5
2
2.
5
3
−20000 −10000 0 10000 20000
Peer Focal penalty−PR Threshold
Programmed Inspections Only
Total Violations
20
00
40
00
60
00
80
00
−20000 −10000 0 10000 20000
Peer Focal penalty−PR Threshold
Programmed Inspections Only
Initial Penalties
The panels show compliance for different measures of compliance, and different
sample restrictions, in an inspection of a workplace, by its "focal penalty," or the
highest penalty levied at a previous inspection of any member of its peer group
beginning May 2009. Peer groups are defined based on shared sector (as tabulated
in Table 1.1) and zip code. Each dot corresponds to an average over a $2,500
bandwidth of focal penalty, with 90% confidence intervals included. The
continuous lines represent quadratic polynomials fitted separately on each side of
the cutoff. Sample period is May 2009- Dec 2012, and excludes state-plan states
and Regions 2 and 3.
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Figure 1·6: The Effect of Press Releases on the Distribution of
OSHA Penalties
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The panels show a kernel density estimation of the density of initial penalties
occurring in 2008, excluding state-plan states. The bottom panel includes a
vertical line at $40,000, the cutoff used in Regions 1 and 4 at the time for issuing
press releases. Other regions were either not using using a cutoff rule, or were
using a much higher cutoff, at this time.
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2.1 Introduction
The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) has been controversial
since its founding in terms of whether it is a job killer (Sherk 2011; Knieser and
Leeth 2015) or a fighter against jobs that kill (Feldman 2011, Pelley 2008). Under-
lying this controversy is a scientific debate about the role of regulatory intervention
in the provision of workplace safety and health. The economic theory of perfectly
competitive labor markets implies that to the extent enforcement of safety regu-
lations improves safety outcomesany improvement will cause wages to decline so
much that on average, employees are worse off (Smith 1979a). Alternatively, mar-
ket imperfections (such as lack of information about hazards and cost-effective safety
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practices) may be so large that enforcement of regulations can improve safety with
little reduction in employment or earnings.
Empirical analysis has been unable to settle this debate, in part due to the diffi-
culties in estimating the causal effect of OSHA enforcement inspections. For example,
many OSHA inspections target workplaces with recent accidents or safety complaints,
and these workplaces often have both ongoing safety problems and due to mean re-
version, experience above-average reductions in injuries (Ruser 1995). Thus, many
inspections may correlate with changes in injury rates without causing them. Perhaps
as a result of these challenges, existing studies have found a wide range of estimated
effects.1 Without a valid counterfactual group of workplaces eligible, but not se-
lected, for inspections, such as in a randomized control trial, it is difficult to identify
the causal effect of the average OSHA inspection.2
However, a drawback of randomizing enforcement resources is it limits the ability
to target those resources to where they are likely to be most effective. There are many
reasons to believe the effects of OSHA enforcement are highly heterogeneous, for
example due to variation in knowledge of proper safety practices (Vickers et al 2013).
As a result, targeting inspections correctly could potentially improve the effectiveness
of the average inspection enormously, a task particularly crucial for an agency with
resources as limited as OSHA's. According to OSHA's website, OSHA's roughly 2,200
inspectors are charged with ensuring the health and safety of roughly 130 million
1For example, some careful studies find OSHA inspections have little or no correlation with
subsequent workplace injury rates (Smith 1979b; Viscusi 1979; Ruser et al. 1991; Bartel et al. 1985)
or violations (Weil 2001), whereas others find that OSHA inspections correlate with a decline in
injury rates (Gray and Scholz. 1993; Mendoloff et al. 2005; Haviland et al. 2012; Foley et al. 2008)
and violations (Ko et al. 2010; Bartel et al. 1985). Sometimes a single study finds both positive
and negative results, depending on time period or sector (Gray et al. 2005; Baggs et al. 2003).
2A few studies have overcome these identification challenges by analyzing the effects of randomized
inspections. A study of randomized inspections at manufacturing plants by Cal-OSHA found large
declines in injuries with no detectable job loss (Levine et al. 2012). Another found randomized
safety inspections in Norway led to significantly improved compliance with safety regulations (Dahl
and SÃ¸berg 2013). In contrast, a study of manufacturing plants in Ontario found no decline in
injuries (Hogg-Johnson et al. 2012).
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U.S. workers.3 Thus, OSHA and other regulatory agencies face a tradeoff between
randomizing enforcement to evaluate its effectiveness, and targeting enforcement to
improve its effectiveness.4
In this paper, we shed light on this issue by conducting an evaluation of federal
OSHA's largest non-construction intervention, Site Specific Targeting (SST) using
a randomized controlled trial (RCT). Under SST, OSHA prioritized some of the
most hazardous workplaces in the country for enforcement inspections and utilized
random assignment to allocate a subset of these inspections. From 2001-2010, roughly
16,000 establishments employing over 2.2 million workers were eligible for randomized
inspections, making this the largest group-level randomized trial we know of.
Our estimates imply the average randomized OSHA SST inspection led to a sig-
nificant decline in injuries. Among establishments eligible for randomized SST in-
spections, we find those that were inspected had roughly 6.5 percent fewer injuries
involving Days Away fromWork (DAFW), compared to those eligible but not selected,
over the five years comprising the year of selection and four subsequent years.
In contrast, we cannot detect any effect of inspections on employment, sales, es-
tablishment survival, or creditworthiness. Our point estimates imply inspections may
lead to a small decline in employment and sales, and a small increase in the proba-
bility of establishment survival, but none of these estimates is significantly different
from zero.
To inform the extent to which inspections could be better targeted, we then inves-
tigate heterogeneity in the effects of inspections. We use an extremely simple model
of optimal enforcement which suggests inspections will be more effective among es-
tablishments in more dangerous sectors, those with higher injuries conditional on
sector (which we call shirking), and those with more injuries overall (roughly the
3https://www.osha.gov/oshstats/commonstats.html
4Another benefit of randomization is its potential deterrent effect on workplaces who risk inspec-
tion. Measuring this kind of deterrent effect has its own host of empirical challenges.
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combination of sector and shirking). We predict sector danger, shirking, and DAFW
injuries for each establishment in our sample in the year of random assignment using
a simple machine learning approach to avoid overfitting.
Our moderators have enormous explanatory power, consistent with the premise
that the effects of inspections are highly heterogeneous. For example, a one-unit
increase in predicted shirking leads the number of injuries averted following an
inspection to roughly triple.
These results suggest OSHA could dramatically improve the effectiveness of its
inspections through better targeting. Our findings can help OSHA better allocate its
limited enforcement resources, while also shedding light on the factors that perpetuate
unsafe working conditions, such as managerial knowledge gaps and fixed costs of
compliance with OSHA regulations. Combined, these insights have the potential to
help OSHA prevent thousands of injuries and fatalities in American workplaces each
year in a cost-effective manner.
These results also contribute to a large literature on the effects of regulatory
enforcement. A large literature has investigated the effects of OSHA enforcement in-
spections on compliance and injuries, many of which were cited in the first paragraph.
We advance this literature by providing new, rigorous, large-sample estimates of the
effects of randomized inspections
In addition, our estimates of heterogeneous treatment effects and implications for
targeting contributes to a growing literature on predictive policing, which analyzes
places (or sometimes people or times) where crimes are likely to occur (Sherman
2013). In the realm of regulatory enforcement, a team of researchers are currently
using machine learning to predict where OSHA inspections are likely highest.5 We go
beyond this literature by estimating where the response of injuries to inspections is
5This research is in progress and is led by Cary Coglianese and Adam Finkel:
http://www.upenn.edu/almanac/volumes/v57/n16/osha.html
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highest, rather than just predicting where crimes (injuries, violations, etc) are most
likely to be.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we describe the
institutional background of the SST program, in Section 3 we describe our data
and measures, and Section 4 describes our empirical specification. Section 5 gives
the baseline empirical results. Section 6 provides our illustrative model of optimal
enforcement, and empirical results on heterogeneous treatment effects based on this
model. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
2.2 OSHA's Site-Specific Targeting (SST) Program
From 1996-2011, the OSHA Data Initiative (ODI) surveyed between 60,000 and 80,000
establishments in a set of hazardous industries6 to gather data on their injuries,
illnesses and employment. The survey was sent mid-year, and employers report their
data from the previous calendar year. The injury and illness data were taken from
logs on which employers are mandated to record every work-related injury or illness
that occurs during a calendar year.7
Each year 2001-2010, between May and August, OSHA issued an annual directive
for its Site-Specific Targeting (SST) program, in which it placed establishments that
reported the highest injury rates in the previous year's ODI survey on a Target
List with the goal of inspecting each of these establishments over the next twelve
months or so. Typically, the roughly 3,500 establishments which reported the highest
rates of injuries were put on the Primary List, and the 7,000 reporting the next-
highest rates were put on the Secondary List.8 To get a sense of how hazardous these
6These industries were based on the set of High Hazard Industries classified by the BLS. Before
2003 this list was updated each year, and thereafter was based on the 2003 classification.
7The 300 form employers fill out can be found here:
https://www.osha.gov/recordkeeping/RKform300pkg-fillable-enabled.pdf. They are required
by OSHA standard 29 CFR 1904.
8The specific cutoffs for the Primary and Secondary List change each year, and since 2009 vary
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workplaces were, establishments placed on the Primary List between 2001 and 2010
had reported an average of 12.8 injuries involving days away from work, job transfer,
or job restriction (or DART injuries) per 100 full-time employees, and those on
the Secondary reported 7. As a point of comparison, the DART rate for all private
industry over the same period in the U.S. was 2.8.9
After creating the Target Lists, OSHA headquarters then distributed to each of its
138 Area Offices around the country the establishments on the Primary List located in
the Office's geographic jurisdiction. However, OSHA Area Offices often did not have
enough resources to inspect every establishment on the Primary Target List in their
jurisdiction. Each Area Office then determined how many establishments it could
feasibly inspect given its staff resources, and inputted that number into software. The
software then randomly assigned that many establishments for inspection, and the
Office was required to inspect each of these establishments before the next year's SST
directive begun. If an Area Office exhausted its entire Primary Target List, OSHA
headquarters and the Area Office use an identical procedure to select establishments
for inspection from the Secondary Target List of workplaces located in that Area
Office's geographic jurisdiction.
SST inspections are unannounced, and establishments are not aware if they have
been selected for SST inspection until the inspector shows up at their front door.
They are plant-wide inspections that cover all aspects of safety.
by industry. For example, in 2008, establishments reporting a rate of at least 11 injuries involving
days away restricted or transferred (DART), or 9 injuries involving days away from work (DAFW),
per 100 full-time employees, were put on the Primary List, and those reporting DART between 7
and 11, or DAFW between 5 and 9, were put on the Secondary List.
9Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics Industry Injury and Illness Data, accessed from BLS website
2/13/15: http://www.bls.gov/iif/oshsum.htm10Supplemental_News_Release_Tables
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2.3 Data and Measures
2.3.1 Data
We assembled our analysis dataset from four underlying datasets: annual SST target
lists, ODI survey data on injuries and employment, OSHA's inspections database,
and data on establishment-level employment, sales and credit rating based on Dun
and Bradstreet records.
First, we obtained the annual SST Primary and Secondary Target Lists from
OSHA's Office of Statistical Analysis. These lists report the set of establishments
at risk of SST inspection each year during 2001-2010. The Target Lists include each
establishment's corresponding Area Office and whether OSHA selected it for a SST
inspection.
Second, we obtained the annual ODI Survey dataset from OSHA's Office of Statis-
tical Analysis. This dataset contains the annual survey results reported by establish-
ments to OSHA from 1996 to 2011. The ODI data contain annual counts of several
types of injuries (in increasing order of severity: injuries involving job transfers or
restrictions, injuries involving days away from work, and injuries resulting in deaths)
and illnesses (in categories such as skin disorders, respiratory problems, poisoning,
and hearing loss), annual average employment, and total hours.
The ODI data constitute an unbalanced panel at the establishment level. In
principles, the universe of establishments with at least 40 employees, and in the
set of high hazard industries, was to be surveyed at least every three years. In
addition, beginning around 2005, establishments reporting a DART rate of at least
7.0 were automatically re-surveyed the following-year. Because annual ODI reporting
is triggered by an injury rate threshold that is below the injury rate thresholds used
to create the SST Primary and Secondary Target Lists, and because injury rates are
serially correlated across years, many of the establishments in our sample are observed
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nearly every year.
Third, we downloaded data from OSHA's inspection record database, the Inte-
grated Management Information System (IMIS), from the Department of Labor's
website. IMIS contains records of each OSHA inspection, including the name and ad-
dress of the establishment inspected, the inspection date, whether the inspection was
actually carried out, and whether the inspection was initiated under SST, a different
national emphasis program, or triggered by an event such as a serious accident a com-
plaint. We also used IMIS to identify the number and severity of violations detected
in each inspection (if any), and the gravity a measure of the severity of the hazard
caused by the violationassociated with these violations. Using MatchIt software, the
Stata reclink package, and hand linking, we fuzzy matched IMIS dataset to the SST
Target List dataset using the establishments' names, addresses and industry.
Finally, we obtained establishments' annual sales, survival, credit rating, and busi-
ness characteristics, from the National Establishment Time Series (NETS) database.
NETS is a panel dataset of establishment characteristics extracted from Dun & Brad-
street and seeks to include all establishments in the U.S. NETS can be linked to the
ODI dataset and SST Target Lists using a unique establishment ID common to both
datasets (Data Universal Numbering System (DUNS) number).
2.3.2 Outcomes
Injuries
Our primary safety outcome is annual number of injuries involving days away from
work (DAFW). We choose this measures as our primary outcome for a few reasons.
First, among all types of injuries reported to ODI, DAFW injuries are likely to be
the most accurate (see Appendix A for a discussion of the validity of ODI-reported
injuries). DAFW injuries are the most serious reported to ODI, and serious injuries
are more likely to be reported by employees to supervisors (Biddle and Roberts 2003),
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and to be reported by employers on an OSHA log (Boden et al 2010). Second, DAFW
injuries impose enormous costs and are thus an outcome of substantial policy interest:
Waehrer, et al. (2007) estimate the average cost of a serious injury to be roughly
$50,000.
Business Outcomes
Our second set of outcomes includes business outcomes. These include total annual
hours (from ODI), total annual employment (both from ODI and from NETS), sales
(NETS), and organizational survival (NETS). We also analyze two credit ratings
created by Dun & Bradstreet. First, we analyzed an establishment's lowest monthly
PAYDEX score each year, a score ranging from 1-100, where higher scores reflect
faster payment of bills, with a score of 80 = prompt and a score of 20 means the
dollar-weighted value of bills are paid 120 days beyond terms. The second is D&B's
Composite Credit Appraisal, an ordinal variable (with values Limited, Fair, Good and
High) which reflects D&B's overall assessment of risk of default and slow payments.10
OSHA Compliance
We treat outcomes related to OSHA compliance as secondary, as our power to detect
effects on them is low.
We first examine OSHA complaint inspections, which are the result of complaints
from employees asserting that an employer is exposing employees to the potential
for physical harm and the relatively rare fatality/catastrophe inspections, which
follow reports of an employee's death or hospitalization of three or more employ-
ees (OSHA). Complaint inspections measure both underlying compliance, underlying
risks, and employees' willingness to complain. Fatality/catastrophe inspections mea-
sure both OSHA compliance and the underlying risks of the sector and employer. We
10http://www.dnb.com/company/our-data/risk-management-tools-dnb-ratings/rating-paydex-
and-score-tables.html last accessed March 25, 2016
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measure the number of complaint and fatality/catastrophe inspections each estab-
lishment experiences each calendar year.
Further measures of OSHA compliance are violations and gravity in future OSHA
inspections. Because the occurrence of certain types of inspections are plausibly en-
dogenous to Treatment, we restrict our analysis of compliance to that observed in
non-SST programmed inspections (for example, an inspection under OSHA's empha-
sis program to prevent amputations), as these are least likely to be endogenous to
Treatment. In years in which an establishment has no such inspections, this variable
is missing. We topcode both violations and gravity at their respective 98th percentile.
2.4 Methods
Creating the Analysis Sample
Our analysis sample consists of establishments eligible for SST inspection for which
establishments randomly selected for inspection (Treatments) have suitable control
establishments at risk of, but not selected for, random inspection (Controls).
Several nuances of OSHA's procedures are important for our study. For example,
after the Area Office used the software to generate a randomly assigned subset of
establishments on the Target List to inspect, OSHA procedures state the Area Office
should delete any establishments that had already been inspected in the previous three
years. Thus, establishments meeting this deletion criteria are not eligible for inspec-
tion, and we remove them from our set of potential Treatments and Controls. We also
remove from our sample those establishments that OSHA included on Primary Target
Lists because they reported exceptionally low injury rates; such establishments were
included because of concerns over the accuracy of their ODI-reported injury rates.
Finally, we remove from our analysis Area Offices located in states with their own
state-run OSHA offices. These states are outside of federal OSHA's jurisdiction, and
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the federal office has no means to check if those offices followed SST randomization
procedures.
Requiring that Treatments have controls in the same area and year restricts us to
Area Office-Year-Target Lists (Primary or Secondary) with at least one establishment
selected to receive an SST inspection, and at least one eligible but not selected.
Table A.1 describes the process we used to create our analysis sample and re-
ports a narrowing pipeline of establishments that remained in our sample after we
applied each of the sample refinements described above. The unit of observation is
the establishment-year because some establishments show up multiple times in this
sample. From 2001-2010, the Primary Target Lists included 23,364 workplaces se-
lected for inspection and 14,847 available, but not selected, and the Secondary Lists
included 8,781 selected and 55,144 not selected. Replicating OSHA's SST protocols
and restricting establishments to the randomized sample resulted in an analysis sam-
ple of 4,514 Treatments and 5,494 Controls from Primary Target Lists, and 2,542
Treatments and 3,732 Controls from Secondary Target Lists. The entire sample of
16,282 establishment-years comes from 13,142 unique establishments.
Table 1 gives the industry distribution of establishments in our sample, and Table
2 provides summary statistics for most of our key outcome variables.
2.4.1 Balance Tests on Baseline Covariates
To obtain reassurance that our analysis sample is generated based on random assign-
ment, we regress baseline covariates on a Treatment dummy and fixed effects for
each Area Office-Year dyad (the unit at which the randomization takes place).
Results are reported in Table 3 and 4. Table 3 includes covariates collected in
the ODI data: Injury rates (those involving days away (DAFW), as well as those
involving transfer), employment, and hours. Also included are variables from the
NETS database: employment, sales, and PAYDEX credit score. We restrict the
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baseline period for these covariates to two years prior to the focal year, because the
Target Lists in year t are constructed based on injury rates that happened in year
t-2, though we obtain essentially identical results if we include years t-4 through t-1.
We also include the number of years the establishment has previously shown up on
the SST Target List prior to the focal year. Treatments overall appear statistically
indistinguishable from Controls in terms of most baseline covariates.
Table 4 includes variables related to OSHA inspection and compliance history,
and for these regressions we include years t-3 through t-1. Treatments and Controls
are indistinguishable in terms of each covariate we consider.
2.4.2 Empirical Specification
To ensure our estimates are not vulnerable to large outliers or other threats to iden-
tification, we conducted a series of tests to pre-specify our econometric specification.
To implement this procedure, we deleted the Treatment variable to blind ourselves to
which establishments in our analysis sample were randomly selected to be inspected
under SST (the true Treatments) and which were not (the true Controls). We also
removed data on outcomes closely linked to treatment status, such as inspections
and violations. We detail this procedure in a pre-analysis plan we posted before
conducting our empirical analysis (see Appendix B).
In each of 500 simulation runs, we randomly assigned a simulated placebo Treat-
ment dummy to a proportion of our analysis sample corresponding to the proportion
of true Treatments each Area Office (i.e. the proportion of our sample randomly
selected for SST inspection). We then estimated the effect of this placebo treat-
ment using various functional forms and handling of outliers. The goal was to find
which specifications most consistently give a precisely estimated zero coefficient on
the placebo Treatment dummies across all simulations.
Based on the results of these simulations, our preferred specification is:
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Yijtτ = β1 ∗ Treatmentit ∗ PostFocalitτ + β2 ∗ PostFocalitτ+ (2.1)
µjt ∗ PostFocalitτ + λit + γτ + ijtτ (2.2)
Treatment is a dummy equal to one if establishment i, in the boundaries of Area
Office j, on the SST Target List in focal year t, is randomly selected for SST
inspection, and Post Focal Year is a dummy equal to one in calendar years τ beginning
with the focal year (τ ≥ t). We include PostFocal separately as a control variable
to account for changes in injuries (and other outcomes) following the focal year that
would happen even in the absence of SST inspection. Per the procedure OSHA uses
to create the SST Target Lists, each establishment's focal year t follows a year in
which it had exceptionally high injury rates, and workplace injury rates that spike
upward in one year, on average, return to a lower level the following year (that is,
they exhibit mean reversion") (Ruser 1995). Thus, β2 captures any mean reversion in
injury rates following the focal year that is common to both Treatments and Controls.
As a result, β1 estimates the treatment effect of being selected for SST inspection,
above and beyond any change in injury rates (or other outcomes) that would happen
anyway following a year of exceptionally high injury rates. λit is a fixed effect for
each establishment-focal year that is included in the analysis sample, and µjt is a
fixed effect for each Area Office*Focal Year (the unit at which randomization took
place) included in the sample, which must be multiplied by Post Focal to not drop out
of the regression (since area-focal year is constant within establishment-focal year).
Finally, γτ is a fixed effect for each calendar year. Standard errors are clustered at
the establishment-focal year it level.
In some specifications, to estimate the temporal effects of Treatment by year
relative to the focal year, we adopt Equation 1 in an event-study design the following
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way:
Yijtτ =
4∑
k=−4
βk ∗ Treatmentit ∗ 1τ=t+k + δk1τ=t+k+ (2.3)
µjt ∗ PostFocalitτ + λit + γτ + ijtτ (2.4)
So here, βk estimates the difference in outcome y between Treatments and Controls
k years relative to the focal year.
To reduce the effect of very large outliers, we top-code our measures of injury
counts (which exhibited positive skew) at their 99th percentiles. We analyze the log
of our continuous outcome measures: sales and employment. To reduce the effect of
very small outliers, we added the first non-zero percentile of each respective measure
prior to taking logs.
To examine the effect of Treatment on DAFW injury count, we use a Poisson
regression model with establishment-level conditional fixed effects, specifying Equa-
tion (1) as the conditional mean function for y, assuming y conditional on our set of
explanatory variables is distributed Poisson. To estimate the effect of Treatment on
each of our business outcomes (employment, sales, PAYDEX score, Composite Credit
Appraisal score) and compliance outcomes, we estimate Equation (1) using OLS.
To examine the effect of Treatment on establishment survival, we run a Cox pro-
portional hazard model with a stratum for each area-office-year (the unit of random-
ization) and conditioning on industry and employment in t-2 (that is, the year's ODI
response on which the focal target list is based).
2.4.3 Complications to the Intention-to-Treat Design
While our setting provides a clean experimental design in an intent-to-treat (in our
setting, intent to inspect) framework, there are complications in interpreting the
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coefficients as the causal effect of an inspection.
The first complication is that establishments which are Treatments in a given
calendar year (that is, were assigned for inspection based on the SST Directive from
that year) are often not inspected until the following calendar year. This delay is
due to the misalignment between calendar years and SST Directive years. Because
SST Directives typically are issued between May and August, a directive year almost
always covers the second half of the corresponding calendar year and the first half of
the following calendar year.
Second, Treatment and Control status do not exactly correspond to whether or not
an establishment was actually inspected. Some Treatments are not SST-inspected as,
for example, when an inspector cannot physically locate the establishment. Further-
more, under very rare circumstances, an Area Office can petition OSHA Headquarters
to exempt it from completing a randomization cycle. Moreover, some Controls may
experience other types of OSHA inspections (e.g., under another emphasis program,
or following a complaint or accident).
Third, some workplaces reappear in the ODI dataset in subsequent years and may
be eligible for an SST inspection in a future year. In this case, a control in an early
year may reappear on the SST Target List and be SST-inspected in a later year.
These complications are illustrated in Figure 1, which plots the percent of Treat-
ments and Controls which have had at least one SST inspection as of 0, 1, 2, 3,
and 4 years after the focal year. Panel A defines years using calendar years, and
Panel B uses SST Directive Years. Comparing the leftmost point of Panels A and B
(corresponding to the focal year) reveals how the misalignment between calendar and
Directive years effectively delays the onset of Treatment: 18 percent of Treatments
have been SST-inspected by the end of their focal calendar year, but by the end of the
following calendar year the percent jumps up to 73 percent. As Panel B illustrates,
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this delay in Treatment largely disappears when we instead use Directive Years: 59
percent of Treatments are SST-inspected by the end of their focal Directive year.
Figure 1 also illustrates the imperfect adherence of Treatment. Even by the end of
the Directive year following the focal Directive year, roughly 25 percent of Treatments
have not been SST inspected.11
Figure 1 also illustrates the third complication: by the end of 1, 2, 3, and 4 calendar
years following the focal calendar year, 6, 17, 23, and 28 percent of establishments
which are Controls in the focal year have been SST-inspected.
In short, our Intent-to-Treat (ITT) estimate yields the difference in outcomes
between establishments randomly selected for SST inspection in one year to estab-
lishments eligible, but not selected, that year.
In an OLS world, to estimate the Treatment Effect on the Treated (TOT), we
can scale the coefficients in our ITT framework by dividing by the percent of Treat-
ments who actually get an SST inspection minus the percent of controls who get one.
With our count variable of injuries, we can run an instrumental-variables Poisson
regression with fixed effects or switch to a linear model of ln(injury count+1) and run
instrumental-variables with fixed effects. For now though, we omit this exercise, and
leave our results as ITT.
2.5 Baseline Empirical Results
2.5.1 Effects of SST Inspection on Injuries
Figure 2 plots an event-study graph, corresponding to the event-study variation on
Equation 1, plotting the coefficient and 95 percent confidence interval from a Poisson
regression for a set of dummies for each year relative to the focal year interacted with
Treatment (the omitted year is t-2). The dependent variable is DAFW injury count.
11It is possible OSHA inspected some of these workplace, but our procedure to link SST with
OSHA's information system (IMIS) failed to find the corresponding inspection in IMIS.
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For each of the 4 years prior to the focal year, the coefficient hovers around zero.
Beginning with the focal year, the coefficient becomes negative, hovering between
-.04 and -.05 each year.
Table 5 gives our regression estimates of the effects of SST inspection on the
number of injuries resulting in days away from work (DAFW). The first column
estimates Equation (1) with the dependent variable equal to 1 if the establishment
has been SST-inspected at least once by each calendar year (and zero in the years
prior to the focal year); this just gives a regression-adjusted estimate of the difference
in mean inspection rates calculated from Figure 1.
Columns 2-4 provide ITT estimates of the effects of SST inspection on DAFW
injuries. Treatments are estimated to have 3 percent fewer injuries (P=0.075) than
Controls over the assignment year and four following years. This estimate is essen-
tially unchanged controlling for contemporaneous total working hours (Column 3)
and NETS employment (Column 4).
The effects of inspections might attenuate after a few years or might take a few
years to emerge. To test for such changes in the effects of inspections over time, we
replaced the single posttreatment dummy for inspected establishments with a dummy
coded 1 only in the randomized inspection year and a series of dummies for each of
the subsequent 4 years. The coefficient is negative in each year (Column 5), with the
largest magnitude and highest statistical significance in year t+1.
Scaling the ITT estimate in Column 2 by the first stage coefficient in Column 1
implies SST inspections lead to (3/.46=) 6.5 percent fewer DAFW injuries per year.
Given that Control establishments averaged 5.41 DAFW injuries per year over the
five years comprising the focal year and four following years, our estimates imply each
SST inspection averted .065*5.4*5 = 1.76 DAFW injuries over the five years following
inspection.
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Because our primary estimate pools estimates from 10 years the SST program ran
(2001-2010), an interesting question is the extent to which the effect of inspections
was stable across these years. To test for stability, we estimated the effects of SST
inspection separately for each Directive Year; that is, we estimate Equation 1 ten
times, restricting the sample to establishments on each year's respective SST Target
List from 2001-2010. The results are depicted in Figure 3. For six out of the ten
years, the estimated effect of inspections on DAFW injuries is stable around -0.08,
the estimate hovers around zero for the 2003, 2004 and 2009 Target List, and is
statistically significantly positive for the 2002 Target List (Î² = 0.12). In future
work, we plan to explore the source of this heterogeneity across years, especially the
behavior for the 2002 Target List.
2.5.2 Economic Outcomes
In contrast to the results on injuries resulting in days away from work, there is not a
consistent relationship between inspections and the economics outcomes we examined.
We first look at establishment survival in the NETS database. Figure 4 plots the
percent of Treatments and Controls alive (i.e. in operation) in the NETS database
each year relative to the focal year. The survival rates of Treatments are, if anything,
slightly higher relative to Controls beginning two years following the focal year, but
overall appear quite similar.
To estimate survival in a statistical model, we ran a survival analysis using all post-
inspection data (until the NETS dataset ends in 2012). We ran a Cox proportional
survival model with a separate stratum for each area-office year. We conditioned on
each establishment's sector (as defined in Table 1), and their employment (from ODI)
from two years prior to inspection.
The Cox model (Table 6) predicts whether the establishment failed to survive
(that is, died) by 2012. The survival rates of treatments are slightly higher, but
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not economically and statistically significantly different from those of controls. The
coefficient on Treatment is -.05 (p-value = 0.20), meaning Treatments are 5 percent
less likely to have died by the end of the sample relative to Controls, for which 21
percent had died by the end of the sample period.
Because company death is relatively rare, we also analyzed whether random in-
spections affected establishments' sales (from NETS) three measures of employment
(log employment from NETS, log employment from ODI and log total hours from
ODI) and creditworthiness (PAYDEX score and Credit Composite Appraisal score).
Results are reported in Table 7. None of these outcomes have an economically large
or statistically significantly relationship to inspections. For sales and all three em-
ployment measures the coefficient on treatment is small, negative and nowhere close
to statistically significant.
2.5.3 OSHA Compliance Outcomes
Table 8 gives our estimates of the effects of SST inspections on OSHA enforcement
and compliance outcomes. Because these variables are based on OSHA inspections,
for which we have dates, they are calculated at the SST directive year, as opposed to
calendar year, level.
The estimate in Column 2 suggests Treatments leads to .0021 fewer complaint
inspections, or 9 percent of the mean for the Controls, but is not statistically signifi-
cant.
Columns 3-4 consider the effects of Treatment on compliance with OSHA reg-
ulations assessed at future non-SST programmed inspections. We considered these
compliance outcomes secondary, as our power to detect an effect for these outcomes
was quite low. Indeed, we find point estimates that are based on a small sample, are
nowhere near statistically significant and small in magnitude so we draw little, if any,
conclusions from these last estimates.
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2.6 Robustness checks
As a pre-specified robustness check, we ran an alternative specification that does
not control for time invariant establishment characteristics, but which estimates a
model in the post-period only controlling for pre-period average of the dependent
variable. This specification, typically called Analysis of Covariance (ANCOVA), is of
the following form:
Y postijtτ = β1 ∗ Treatmentit + β2 ∗ ypreit + µjt + γτ + ijtτ (2.5)
Where Y postijtτ is an outcome for establishment i in the boundary of Area Office
j in calendar years τ beginning with the focal year t and four following years (t ≤
τ ≤ t + 4), ypreit is the mean of y for establishment i over the four years prior to the
focal year (or the mean of log(y+ 1) when y is a count variable and we use a Poisson
specification),12 µjt are dummies for each Area-Office Focal Year, γτ are dummies for
each calendar year, and Treatment is defined as in the previous specification.
Results using the ANCOVA specification for injuries, business, and compliance
outcomes are in Appendix Tables A.2-A.4. In all cases, point estimates are nearly
identical to those obtained from our main specification.
2.7 Heterogeneous Treatment Effects
2.7.1 Illustrative framework of optimal targeting
In this section we present a minimalist illustrative framework to think about optimal
targeting of inspections. We assume injuries Iijt at workplace i in sector j in year t
12In a Poisson regression, a coefficient on ypreit would be an estimate of how much a one-unit change
in pre-period y is correlated with a one-percent change in post-period y, whereas a coefficient on
log(ypreit ) estimates how much a one-percent change in pre-period y is correlated with a one-percent
change in post-period y, which is more appropriate for an ANCOVA specification. We add 1 to ypreit
before taking the log to account for zeroes.
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depend on inherent danger of sector technology (θj), managerial shirking (or lack of
effort) sit, and transitory factors it. We assume managerial shirking and transitory
factors both are proportionately more dangerous when technology is more dangerous,
so total injuries,
Iijt = θj ∗ sit ∗ jt
Shirking could mean lack of knowledge of proper safety practices, willful disre-
gard for those practices, etc. Sector danger could be production processes inherent to
industry, location and size. Assume E(jtsit) = E(jtθj) = 0, and that E(jt) = µ), a
constant which we normalize to 1.
Suppose ex ante, sit = s0i and that OSHA inspections leads shirking to fall by a
multiplicative factor:
sit = s
0
i (If not inspected)
sit = ψis
0
iψi ∈ [ψmin, 1] (If inspected)
Where ψmin > 0. We assume for now ψi is constant, but in later work we may
relax this assumption.
Thus, the treatment effect of being inspected for establishment i is the difference
in the expected number of injuries if inspected, relative to if not inspected:
(ψ − 1)θjs0i
This model suggests that inspections will lead to a larger absolute decline in in-
juries when initial shirking is higher, when the establishment's sector is more danger-
ous, and especially when the interaction of the two is higher (that is, when expected
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number of injuries is higher). Note our functional form does not suggest these charac-
teristics will affect the percent decline in injuries (the multiplicative factor ψi affects
percent change, which we assume for now is constant).
Estimating shirking and sector danger
Unfortunately, we do not observe sector danger or shirking directly. However, we
believe each is a function of a set of variables X1 and X2, respectively, based on the
following functional form:
θj = expX1β1
sit = expX2β2
Substituting in and taking logs,
ln(Iit) = X1β1 +X2β2 + νit
Where νit = ln(it).
Once we have decided on X1 and X2, obtaining estimates of θj, s, and I becomes a
standard prediction problem. The candidate set of Xs we include is in Appendix C.X1
contains variables corresponding to an establishment's industry, region and size: its
3-digit SIC industry's average injury rate, lagged 1, 2 and 3 years, its state's lagged
average injury rate, its lagged hours and hours squared, a manufacturing dummy,
etc. X2 contains variables potentially correlated with an establishment's own efforts
towards safety: its own lagged injury rate, number of prior complaint, accident and
other inspections, violations at previous inspections, credit rating, etc. Prior injuries
has less predictive power for current injuries when mean reversion is more likely,
and smaller establishments are especially susceptible to mean reversion (Ruser 1995).
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Thus, X2 also includes measures to account for mean reversion, such as lagged injury
rate interacted with four quartiles of employment.
Because our set of candidate Xs is large, we run the risk of overfitting the data
by including all of them. Thus, use a standard machine learning algorithm that
penalizes overfitting. We use elastic net (a convex combination of LASSO and ridge
regression)13 with cross validation to determine the variable selectin among the Xs.
Because LASSO biases down the coefficients of the variables it retains (Belloni et
al 2012), we run OLS regressions after variable elimination to estimate coefficients.
We perform this analysis on the portion of the SST Target Lists not in our analysis
sample, and use the results to predict sector danger, shirking, and injury count for
the establishments in the analysis sample.
To estimate ln(θj), using the portion of the Target List not in our analysis sample,
we run the elastic net regression ln(Iit) = X1β1 and save the subset of Xs that are
not eliminated, X˜1. We then run the OLS regression ln(Iit) = X˜1β1 + it, save the
estimated coefficients, and use them to predict θˆj = X˜1βˆ1 for the establishments in
our analysis sample.
To estimate ln(s0i ), , we construct a measure of excess injuries unexplained by
sector danger, ln(Iit) − θˆj) Using the portion of the Target List not in our analysis
sample, we run the elastic net regression ln(Iit)− θˆj = X2β2, and save the subset of
Xs that are not eliminated, X˜2. We then run OLS regression ln(Iit)− θˆj = X˜2β2, save
the estimated coefficients, and use them to predict sˆ0i = X˜2βˆ2 for the establishments
in our analysis sample.
To estimate ln(Iit), using the portion of the Target List not in our analysis sample,
we run the OLS regression ln(Iit) = X˜1β1 + X˜2β2 + it, save the estimated coefficients,
and use them to predict Iˆit = X˜1βˆ1X˜2βˆ2 for the establishments in our analysis sample.
13give LASSO a weight of 0.95 and ridge a weight of 0.05 in the elastic net, but results are
essentially unchanged using different weights.
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2.7.2 Estimates of heterogeneous treatment effects
The distribution of predicted log sector danger log shirking, and log DAFW injury
count are given in Figure A.1.
Our results interacting Treated with our estimates of shirking, sector danger and
expected injuries are given in Table 9. We center predicted shirking, sector danger
and injuries at zero to ease interpretation of the interactions. Our dependent variable
remains count of DAFW injuries, but we use OLS instead of Poisson. We switch to
OLS because our model of optimal targeting makes predictions regarding the absolute,
not percent, change in injuries, and Poisson regressions deal with percent change.
Column 1 reproduces results from the baseline specification (similar to Table 6,
Column 2), but using OLS instead of Poisson. Treated yields a coefficient of -0.24
(SE = 0.12), or 4.4 percent of the sample mean for Controls in the post period, which
is slightly higher magnitude than the Poisson specification.
Column 2 includes an interaction of Treated with predicted ln(shirking), as well as
an interaction of Post focal year with predicted ln(shirking) (not shown) to control
for the main effect. The treatment effect is substantially and statistically significantly
larger for the establishments in our sample with higher predicted shirking: a one-unit
increase in sˆ0i leads to an additional 0.72 injuries averted per year. (SE=0.33).
Column 3 shows a similar pattern for θˆj (predicted injuries given sector), but
the magnitude is smaller and not statistically significant (β = −0.23, SE = 0.29).
Including both sˆ0i and θˆj in Column 3 leaves the magnitudes essentially unchanged.
Finally, Column 5 shows that a one-one increase in predicted log DAFW injury
count leads to an additional 0.39 injuries averted (SE=0.22, p=.07).
In future work, we will also include results of these interactions for our business
and compliance outcomes.
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2.8 Discussion
We find the average randomized OSHA SST inspection was effective at improve safety
outcomes. Control establishments in our sample averaged roughly 5.4 DAFW injuries
per year during the 5 years comprising the focal year and 4 following years. Our
estimates imply the average inspection averted 1.76 DAFW injuries over the focal
year and four subsequent years (5.4*.03/0.46*5=1.76).
On the other hand, we cannot detect any effect of inspections on business out-
comes. Our point estimates for sales and employment are consistently negative and
small in magnitude (meaning inspections lead to lower employment and sales lev-
els), whereas our point estimates for establishment survival suggest inspections may
improve survival, and our estimates on creditworthiness are tiny and inconsistently
signed. Although the samples size in this study is very large, the precision of the
economic estimates is not sufficient to rule out modest, but economically meaningful,
harms or benefits to employers from randomized safety inspections.
However, our inclusion of the interactions implied by our model of optimal target-
ing suggest the effects of OSHA inspections are highly heterogeneous. The benefits of
inspections on averted injuries appears to be concentrated among a subset of our sam-
ple. This subset is comprised of a characteristic we estimate using a procedure OSHA
could easily implement, suggesting the average inspection could avert significantly
more injuries if inspections were better targeted.
While targeting inspections may improve their overall effectiveness, a central
tradeoff is that targeted inspections lose the ability to evaluate their effectiveness.
In other words, randomization provides the opportunity to learn about effectiveness,
but limits the ability to take action to improve effectiveness. In future work, we plan
to explore this tradeoff more thoroughly.
Our study has several limitations. Our estimates ignore effects lasting longer than
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4 years, and the reported confidence intervals on reductions in costs and increases in
profits reflect only the standard error of the point estimates, not the many other
sources of uncertainty regarding these estimates. Furthermore, our estimates of the
effects of inspections on injuries cannot speak to any effect on safety and health
outcomes of temporary workers, as injuries among these workers are not included in
OSHA logs.
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Table 2.1: Industry tabulation for SST Target Lists and analysis sample subset
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All targeted Analysis
establishments Sample
Count % of total Count % of total
Ag, forestry, fishing 915 0.8% 153 0.9%
Mining 67 0.1% 4 0.0%
Construction 47 0.0% 4 0.0%
Manufacturing 62108 55.5% 9165 56.3%
Wholesale Trade 12389 11.1% 1757 10.8%
Retail Trade 5605 5.0% 867 5.3%
Transportation, Warehousing 18286 16.3% 2384 14.6%
Other Services 1328 1.2% 222 1.4%
Nursing Homes 11184 10.0% 1726 10.6%
Number of establishments 111929 16282
The sample in Columns (1)-(2) includes all establishments on the SST Tar-
get Lists from 2001-2010, and the subsample in Columns (3)-(4) includes
the subset of establishments eligible for SST inspection in Area Office-Years
which randomized their target lists, as described in Table A.1.
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Table 2.2: Summary Statistics +/- 4 years from focal year
n mean sd median min max
Injuries with Days Away from Work / 100 FTE
Whole sample 91492 3.99 3.62 3.08 0.00 16.62
Establishments on Primary List 58553 4.45 3.98 3.36 0.00 16.62
Establishments on Secondary List 32939 3.18 2.69 2.69 0.00 16.62
Injuries with job transfer or restriction / 100 FTE
Whole sample 91492 3.61 3.87 2.50 -10.29 16.40
Establishments on Primary List 58553 4.24 4.22 3.15 -10.29 16.40
Establishments on Secondary List 32939 2.51 2.82 1.61 -1.02 16.40
Average number of employees [ODI]
Whole sample 91496 149.73 178.77 95.00 0.00 1257.00
Establishments on Primary List 58557 141.44 166.56 92.00 0.00 1257.00
Establishments on Secondary List 32939 164.45 197.77 101.00 0.00 1257.00
Average number of working hours, 000s
Whole sample 91495 284.49 334.58 181.80 0.00 2369.76
Establishments on Primary List 58556 266.46 311.20 173.66 0.00 2369.76
Establishments on Secondary List 32939 316.55 370.39 197.63 0.00 2369.76
Employment [NETS]
Whole sample 134400 135.76 156.20 88.00 1.00 1030.00
Establishments on Primary List 82490 126.67 142.96 84.00 1.00 1030.00
Establishments on Secondary List 51910 150.22 174.22 95.00 1.00 1030.00
Sales [NETS] (000s)
Whole sample 134371 19714.40 28713.88 10000.00 0.00 181120.00
Establishments on Primary List 82472 17909.16 26825.25 9102.00 4.70 181120.00
Establishments on Secondary List 51899 22583.09 31269.46 11683.20 0.00 181120.00
Minimum PAYDEX score [NETS]a
Whole sample 122395 67.63 10.67 70.00 2.00 96.00
Establishments on Primary List 74534 67.04 10.99 69.00 2.00 96.00
Establishments on Secondary List 47861 68.54 10.10 71.00 2.00 90.00
Composite Credit Appraisal score [NETS]b
Whole sample 63542 2.60 0.74 3.00 1.00 4.00
Establishments on Primary List 38008 2.64 0.75 3.00 1.00 4.00
Establishments on Secondary List 25534 2.54 0.74 3.00 1.00 4.00
Num complaint inspections in calendar year
Whole sample 144981 0.037 0.216 0.000 0.000 6.000
Establishments on Primary List 89163 0.040 0.228 0.000 0.000 6.000
Establishments on Secondary List 55818 0.032 0.195 0.000 0.000 4.000
Violation count over all non-SST prgmd inspections in calendar year
Whole sample 4623 2.38 3.45 1.00 0.00 15.00
Establishments on Primary List 2781 2.49 3.64 1.00 0.00 15.00
Establishments on Secondary List 1842 2.23 3.14 1.00 0.00 15.00
Sum of Gravity over all non-SST prgmd inspections in calendar yearc
Whole sample 4623 6.59 11.26 1.00 0.00 50.00
Establishments on Primary List 2781 6.98 12.03 1.00 0.00 50.00
Establishments on Secondary List 1842 6.00 9.96 2.00 0.00 50.00
All variables topcoded at their respective 99th percentiles, except violations and gravity (which are
topcoded at their 98th percentiles), as well as PAYDEX and CCA score and number of inspections,
which are not topcoded.
The sample consists of the the establishments on the 2001-2010 annual SST Target Lists included in
our analysis sample and includes data within four years of the year placed on the Target List, or the
focal year. The unit of analysis is the establishment-year.
The criteria for the analysis sample is summarized in Table A.1
a PAYDEX is a monthly score ranging 0-100 assigned to an establishment by Dun & Bradstreet
refelecting the speed with which an establishment pays back its creditors, with higher scores reflecting
faster pay. The Min PAYDEX is the minimum score over all monthly reports in a year. This variable
is missing when Dun and Bradstreet lacks sufficient payment information to create a score.
b CCA (Composite Credit Appraisal) score is Dun and Bradstreet's overall assessment of an estab-
lishment's creditworthiness, ranging from 1 (High) to 4 (Limited). This variable is missing when Dun
and Bradstreet lacks sufficient information to create a score.
c Total gravity is the sum of the gravity, or OSHA's score of severity, over all violations found during
an inspection. Our vaiable is constructed as the Total Gravity summed over all non-SST programmed
inspections an establishment experiences in a calendar year.
80
Table 2.3: Balance tests on analysis sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
ODI variables NETS variables SST variables
DAFWa Transferb log log log log Minimum CCA # yrs
injuries injuries (hours (employ- (employ- (sales) PAYDEX scoree previously
per 100 per 100 worked) ment) ment) scored on SST
FTEc FTEc listf
Primary List
Treatment 0.062 -0.17 -0.00082 -0.0055 -0.0070 -0.016 -0.68 -0.0019 0.0048
(0.088) (0.10)+ (0.015) (0.015) (0.019) (0.026) (0.29)* (0.026) (0.032)
Area Office-Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
# treatments 4514 4514 4514 4514 4423 4422 3928 2033 4514
# controls 5494 5494 5494 5494 5381 5380 4785 2454 5494
# Area Office-Years 259 259 259 259 259 259 259 259 259
Mean Dep Var, Controls 6.46 6.22 12.4 4.85 4.56 16.1 67.1 2.63 1.36
Secondary List
Treatment -0.057 0.14 0.043 0.044 0.021 -0.0091 0.19 -0.026 -0.0023
(0.053) (0.079)+ (0.018)* (0.018)* (0.023) (0.030) (0.29) (0.029) (0.039)
Area Office-Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
# treatments 2542 2542 2542 2542 2491 2491 2251 1204 2542
# controls 3732 3732 3732 3732 3644 3643 3347 1782 3732
# Area Office-Years 127 127 127 127 127 127 127 127 127
Mean Dep Var, Controls 3.96 2.87 12.5 4.94 4.67 16.4 68.2 2.55 1.04
The table shows the results of OLS regressions with coefficient on a Treatment dummy and robust SEs in parentheses clustered by Area
Office/Year. The unit of analysis is the establishment/focal-year. The coefficient is an estimate of the level change in the dependent
variable associated with Treatment (that is, assignment for SST inspection). **P<.01., *P<.05, +P<.1
The ODI and NETS variables are from two years prior to the focal year, and # Years Prev on SST List is evaluated as of the focal
year.
The sample includes all establishments eligible for randomized SST inspections in Area Office-Years that randomized their target lists,
as described in Table A.1.
a DAFW = Days Away from Work
b Transfer injuries involve job transfer or restriction.
+ Injury rate variables are calculated by multiplying the number of injuries in a calendar year by 20,000, and then dividing that by
that year's hours worked. To avoid influence of outliers, the numerator and denominator are each topcoded at the 99th percentile,
and the first percentile of hours worked is added to the denominator. The denominator is total hours worked (also topcoded at the
99th percentile) plus the first percentile of hours.
c PAYDEX is a monthly score ranging 0-100 assigned to an establishment by Dun & Bradstreet refelecting the speed with which
an establishment pays back its creditors, with higher scores reflecting faster pay. The Min PAYDEX is the minimum score over all
monthly reports in a year. This variable is missing when Dun and Bradstreet lacks sufficient payment information to create a score.
d CCA (Composite Credit Appraisal) score is Dun and Bradstreet's annual overall assessment of an establishment's creditworthiness,
ranging from 1 (High) to 4 (Limited). This variable is missing when Dun and Bradstreet lacks sufficient information to create a score.
e# years previously on SST List is the number of years the establishment has appeared on the SST Target List prior to the focal year.
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Table 2.4: Balance tests on SST Target Lists, restricted to analysis sample; 1-4
years prior to focal year
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Any comp Any non Total Total
plaint insp complaint viol gravityd
ectiona inspectionb ationsc
Primary List
Treatment 0.0086 -0.00094 0.098 0.48
(0.0077) (0.0078) (0.18) (0.66)
Area Office-Year FE Y Y Y Y
# treatments 4514 4514 1139 1139
# controls 5494 5494 1341 1341
# Area Office-Years 259 259 254 254
Mean Dep Var, Controls 0.12 0.14 2.68 8.72
Secondary List
Treatment 0.0054 -0.017 -0.034 -0.96
(0.0084) (0.010)+ (0.21) (0.89)
Area Office-Year FE Y Y Y Y
# treatments 2542 2542 534 534
# controls 3732 3732 756 756
# Area Office-Years 127 127 123 123
Mean Dep Var, Controls 0.087 0.13 2.62 8.58
The table shows the results of OLS regressions with coefficient on a
Treatment dummy and robust SEs in parentheses clustered by Area Of-
fice/Year. The unit of analysis is the establishment/focal-year. The co-
efficient is an estimate of the level change in the dependent variable as-
sociated with Treatment (that is, assignment for SST inspection). All
specifications include Area Office / Year fixed effects. **P<.01., *P<.05,
+P<.1
The sample in Columns 1 and 2 includes all establishmne eligible for
randomized SST inspections in Area Office-Years which randomized their
target lists, as described in Table A.1. The sample in Columns 3 and 4
is restricted to these establishments that experienced at least one OSHA
inspection in the 3 years prior to the focal year.
a Complaint inspections are those which are triggered by an employee
complaint to OSHA. The variable used is a dummy if the establishment
expereinced at least one complaint inspection in the 4 years prior to the
focal year.
a Non-complaint inspections include inspections triggered by an accident
or referral, or pre-planned as one of OSHA's empahsis programs. The
variable used is a dummy if the establishment expereinced at least one
non-complaint inspection in the 4 years prior to the focal year.
c Total violations is the number of violations found during an inspection.
Our vaiable is constructed as the mean number of violations over all in-
spections an establishment experiences in the four years prior to the focal
year, coded as missing if the establishment experienced zero inspections
during the period.
d Total gravity is the sum of the gravity, or OSHA's score of severity,
over all violations found during an inspection. Our vaiable is constructed
as the mean Gravity over all violations in inspections an establishment
experiences in the four years prior to the focal year, coded as missing if
the establishment experienced zero inspections during the period..
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Table 2.5: Effects of SST Inspection on Injuries Involving Days Away From Work
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
SST DAFW Injury Count
insp-
ected
Treated 0.46 -0.030 -0.028 -0.031
(0.0061)** (0.017)+ (0.016)+ (0.016)*
ln(Average number of working hours) 0.81 0.81
(0.023)** (0.023)**
ln(Employment [NETS]) -0.038
(0.0081)**
Treated*t+0 -0.026
(0.018)
Treated*t+1 -0.044
(0.021)*
Treated*t+2 -0.022
(0.023)
Treated*t+3 -0.031
(0.025)
Treated*t+4 -0.017
(0.029)
# observations 90156 89473 89473 87878 89473
# establishment-focal years 16282 15813 15813 15725 15813
# establishments 13148 12707 12707 12626 12707
# Area Office-Years 386 386 386 386 386
Specification OLS Poisson Poisson Poisson Poisson
Mean DV, Controls, Post period 0.16 5.41 5.41 5.37 5.41
The table shows the results of OLS or Poisson regressions with coefficient on a Treated
dummy and SEs in parentheses. Treated is equal to 1 in years beginning with the focal year,
for establishments selected for SST inspection in the focal year. OLS and Poisson coefficients
are estimates of the level, and percent, change in the dependent variable associated with
Treated, respectively. Poisson drops establishments with only one observation or constant
values across observations. Column 4 drops observations for which NETS data is missing.
All regressions include establishment fixed effects. If an establishment appears more than
once, a separate establishment fixed effect is included for each focal year. Area Office-focal
year, and number of years relative to focal year, fixed effects also included. Standard errors
clustered at the establishment-focal year level. **P<.01., *P<.05, +P<.1
Regressions restricted to analysis sample, described in Table A.1 and is restricted to a
window of 4 years before and after the focal year.
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Table 2.6: Effect of Treatment on Establishment Death
(1)
Hazard Ratio
Treatment -0.050
(0.039)
Pct of Controls That Die by End of Sample (%) 0.21
Observations 16282
# Area Office-Years 386
The table shows results of Stratified Cox Proportional Hazard Model, where the hazard is establishment
death (in NETS) between the focal year and 2012, accounting for the censoring of the dataset in 2012.
Shown is the hazard ratio on a Treatment dummy, equal to 1 for establishments selected for SST inspection
in the focal year. Hazard ratio indicates Treatment increases the probability of death by (Hazard Ratio -1 ),
so that a value less than one means a decreased probability.
Robust SEs in parentheses. **P<.01., *P<.05, +P<.1
The model also controls for establishment sector (as defined in Table 1, and employment (from ODI)
from two years prior to the focal year.
Each Area Office-Year is its own strata, meaning the baseline hazard (of death) is allowed to differ
across Area Office-Years. Regressions restricted to analysis sample, described in Table A.1.
Table 2.7: Effects of SST Inspection on Business Outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
ODI vars NETS vars
SST log log log log Min CCA
insp- (hours (emp) (emp) (sales) PAYDEX scoreb
ected worked) scorea
Treated 0.48 -0.0059 -0.0058 -0.0051 -0.0062 0.070 0.014
(0.0055)** (0.0054) (0.0050) (0.0081) (0.0090) (0.15) (0.013)
# observations 144981 90156 90156 134400 134371 122395 63542
# establishment-focal years 16282 16282 16282 16282 16279 15791 8658
# establishments 13148 13148 13148 13148 13145 12744 6995
# Area Office-Years 386 386 386 386 386 386 386
Specification
Mean DV, Controls, Post period 0.15 12.4 4.88 4.61 16.3 67.8 2.60
The table shows the results of OLS regressions with coefficient on a Treated dummy and SEs in parentheses.
Treated is equal to 1 in years beginning with the focal year, for establishments selected for SST inspection in
the focal year. All regressions include establishment fixed effects. If an establishment appears more than once,
a separate establishment fixed effect is included for each focal year. Area Office-focal year, and number of years
relative to focal year, fixed effects also included. Standard errors clustered at the establishment-focal year level.
**P<.01., *P<.05, +P<.1
Regressions restricted to analysis sample, described in Table A.1 and is restricted to a window of 4 years before
and after the focal year.
a PAYDEX is a monthly score ranging 0-100 assigned to an establishment by Dun & Bradstreet refelecting the
speed with which an establishment pays back its creditors, with higher scores reflecting faster pay. The Min
PAYDEX is the minimum score over all monthly reports in a year.
b CCA (Composite Credit Appraisal) score is Dun and Bradstreet's overall assessment of an establishment's
creditworthiness.
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Table 2.8: Effects of SST Inspection on OSHA compliance-related outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Non SST prog-,
rammed inspections
SST Any # sum of
insp- complaint viols gravity
ected insp
Treated 0.54 -0.0021 0.095 1.28
(0.0063)** (0.0021) (0.55) (1.84)
# observations 144981 144981 4310 4310
# establishment-focal years 16282 16282 3698 3698
# establishments 13148 13148 3149 3149
# Area Office-Years 386 386 381 381
Mean Dep Var, Controls, Post Period 0.18 0.026 2.09 6.28
The table shows the results of OLS regressions with coefficient on a Treated dummy
and SEs in parentheses. Treated is equal to 1 in years beginning with the focal
year, for establishments selected for SST inspection in the focal year. All regressions
include establishment fixed effects. If an establishment appears more than once, a
separate establishment fixed effect is included for each focal year. Area Office-focal
year, and number of years relative to focal year, fixed effects also included. Standard
errors clustered at the establishment-focal year level. **P<.01., *P<.05, +P<.1
The sample in Columns 3-4 is restricted to years in which an establishment experi-
ences at least one non-SST programmed inspection.
Regressions restricted to analysis sample, described in Table A.1, and a window of
+ or - years from focal year.
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Table 2.9: Interaction effect of Treatment with estimated shirking,
sector danger, and DAFW count
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Treated -0.24 -0.094 -0.21 -0.10 -0.096
(0.12)∗ (0.094) (0.11)+ (0.096) (0.088)
treated*Predicted log (shirk) -0.72 -0.60
(0.33)∗ (0.32)+
treated*Predicted log (sector danger) -0.23 -0.17
(0.29) (0.29)
treated*Predicted log (DAFW count) -0.39
(0.22)+
# observations 90153 88922 90109 88878 88878
# establishment-focal years 16282 15937 16271 15926 15926
# establishments 13148 12877 13139 12868 12868
# Area Office-Years 386 386 386 386 386
Specification OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Mean DV, Controls, Post period 5.391 5.387 5.391 5.387 5.387
The table shows results of OLS regressions with coefficient on a Treated dummy and SEs in parentheses.
The dependent variable is DAFW injury count. Treated is equal to 1 in years beginning with the focal year,
for establishments selected for SST inspection in the focal year.
All regressions include establishment fixed effects. If an establishment appears more than once,
a separate establishment fixed effect is included for each focal year.
Area Office-focal year, and years relative to focal year, fixed effects also included.
Standard errors clustered at the establishment-focal year. **P<.01., *P<.05, +P<.1
The predicted log values of shirk, sector danger, and DAFW count are described in the text.
Regressions restricted to analysis sample, described in Table A.1
and restricted to a window of 4 years before and after the focal year.
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Figure 2·1: SST Inspection Rates
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The figure shows the percent of Treatments and Controls with at least one
completed SST inspection by the end of each year, relative to the focal year.
Panel (a) defines years as Calendar Years, and Panel (b) defines years as SST
Directive Years. SST Directive Years typically begin between May-Aug of the
corresponding calendar year.
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Figure 2·2: Temporal Effects of Treatment on DAFW Injuries, by
year relative to focal year
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Each dot is a coefficient on Treatment interacted with a dummy for each
corresponding tau year, with 95% confidence interval. The omitted year is t-2.
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Figure 2·3: ITT Effects of SST Inspections on DAFW Injuries, by
SST Directive Year
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Each dot is a coefficient on Treated, with 95% confidence interval, from a separate
regression corresponding to Equation 1, where the sample is restricted to
establishments in each respective SST Directive year. The dependent variable is
DAFW injury count.
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Figure 2·4: Treatment and Control survival rates in NETS
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The figure shows the percent of Treatments and Controls who are cateogorized as
alive (i.e. in operation) in the NETS database, for each calendar year relative to
the focal calendar year.
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Chapter 3
Cutting Out the Competition: Labor
Market Conditions, the Minimum Wage,
and the Use of Non-Compete Agreements
Abstract: Employers and employees often assign control of nonphysical, potentially
transferrable assets valuable to production, such as trade secrets and client lists, by
the inclusion of a noncompete agreement (NCA) in the employee's contract. NCAs
may provide benefits, such as through enhancing incentives for employers to invest
in such assets, but they also impose a cost to the employee due to the restriction on
post-separation employment. Recent evidence that NCA usage has been growing, and
is prevalent in many low-wage occupations, has raised questions about the rationale
for, and effects of, their use. In this paper, we show labor market conditions and
frictions induced by liquidity constraints can lead to NCA usage, even when NCAs
are inefficient: NCAs arise in equilibrium when liquidity constraints limit the ability
for agents to make monetary transfers. Such constrains may bind as a result of
variation in the minimum wage an employee can accept, or shifts in labor supply
that affect the equilibrium wage. We find strong empirical support for the model's
predictions using a new survey of owners of independent hair salons, an industry in
which NCAs are widely used.
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3.1 Introduction
A large and growing share of U.S. workers sign Non-Compete Agreements (hereafter,
NCAs) as part of their employment contract. NCAs contractually limit a worker's
ability to enter into a professional position in competition with the employer in the
event of a job separation. NCAs can potentially enhance efficiency by solving hold-
up problems that distort incentives to invest in transferable assets, such as general
human capital training, trade secrets, or client lists (Grossman and Hart 1986). At the
same time, NCAs may also impose significant costs on the employee by limiting her
ability to pursue outside employment opportunities. Given this tradeoff, NCAs are
especially prevalent in higher-skill, knowledge intensive industries and occupations in
which transferrable assets are essential to production (Starr et al 2015, Marx 2011).
However, there is a growing awareness that NCAs are also frequently used in many
lower-skill occupations (Starr et al 2015), and recent media coverage has highlighted
their use in minimum wage occupations like fast food workers1. Furthermore, us-
age of2, and litigation over3, NCAs has been growing in recent years. Combined,
this evidence suggests our understanding of the reasons behind NCA usage remains
incomplete.
In this paper, we show that an employer and employee's joint decision to use a
NCA may be driven by factors other than the benefits and costs they each accrue
from such a contractual agreement. In particular, we show that conditions in the
labor market and liquidity constraints that limit monetary transfers can affect NCA
usage. One implication we draw is that, in labor markets with a large supply of labor,
1Neil Irwin. When the Guy Making Your Sandwich Has a Noncompete Clause, The New York
Times, October 14, 2014
2Greenhouse, Steven. Noncompete Clauses Increasingly Pop Up in Array of Jobs, The New
York Times, June 8, 2014
3Simon, Ruth, and Angus Loten. "When a New Job Leads to a Lawsuit  Litigation Over
Noncompete Clauses is Rising; does Entrepreneurship Suffer?" Wall Street Journal, Aug 15 2013
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a worker in a low-wage occupation may sign a NCA if the market clearing wage is
lower than what she can legally accept (e.g. due to a minimum wage law)  even if
the cost she bears under an NCA outweighs the benefit accruing to the employer. In
other words, NCAs may be used as a tool to equilibrate markets when wages are not
fully able to do soeven if NCAs are pairwise inefficient.
We model a perfectly competitive labor market in which contracts consist of a wage
and, possibly, a NCA. NCAs may provide a benefit to the employer but, because they
impose a cost on the employee, the employer must offer a higher wage to compensate
the employee for this cost. If market clearing wages are unconstrained, NCAs will
be used only when the employer's benefit is larger than the employee's cost (i.e.when
NCAs are pairwise efficient); otherwise, NCAs are too expensive to the employer.
Alternatively, in the presence of a minimum wage, NCAs may be used even if they
are pairwise inefficient. A binding minimum wage decreases the extent to which an
employer must compensate the employee for signing a NCA. If the minimum wage is
high enough, the employer can extract more surplus by using a NCA than paying the
minimum wage without one. Because shifts in labor supply and demand affect the
market clearing wage, and thus the extent to which a given minimum wage binds,
such shifts can also affect NCA usage.
In the model, we take no stance on the form the cost and benefit of the NCA.
The cost may represent the inability of an employee to leverage training, trade se-
crets, or client lists in future labor negotiations, or the inability to undertake future
employment opportunities. The benefit to the employer may represent the solution
to a hold-up problem (e.g., the ability of the employer to optimally invest in training,
impart trade secrets, or invest in client attraction), the retention of a client list if the
employer and employee separate, or lower employee turnover.
To test the empirical predictions of our model, we conducted a survey of owners
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of independent hair salons in the U.S., an industry in which the rationale for NCAs
is particularly strong, due to the importance of client retention in production and the
prevalence of on-the-job training. We surveyed members of the Professional Beauty
Association, a trade association for the industry, via email in April 2015. We ended
up with a sample of just over 200 salon owners, representing nearly 1,600 workers.
We find NCAs are indeed widely used: 29% of our sample had their most recently
hired stylist sign a NCA, and 37% have had at least one stylist sign a NCA in the
past.
We find strong empirical support for our model's predictions. Shifts in labor
supply, which we measure as the number of applicants an owner received for her most
recent vacancy, have a large and statistically significant effect on the likelihood the
stylist hired for that vacancy signed a NCA: one additional applicant leads to a 4
percent increase in the probability the hired worker signed a NCA. This result is
robust to the inclusion of controls, and the qualitative result holds for within-owner
changes in the number of applicants received, rather than the level.
We also find the minimum wage affect NCA usage in the way our model predicts.
Owners in states with a higher minimum wage for tipped employees are more likely to
use NCAs. This relationship only holds for the portion of our sample owning salons in
which stylists are hired as employees rather than independent contractors (the latter
not being covered by minimum wages under the Fair Labor Standards Act). Among
employment-based salons, a one-dollar increase in the minimum wage is associated
with a 12.5 percent increase in the probability the owner requires her stylists to sign
NCAs.
This paper contributes to multiple literatures. First, a growing literature has
investigated the rationale for NCAs and the effects of their use. Using variation
in the enforceability of NCAs across states, an increase in NCA enforceability has
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been found to increase firm-sponsored training (Starr 2015), increase firm shareholder
value (Younge and Marx 2015), and decrease employee mobility (Marx, Strumsky
and Flemming 2009). Two papers prior to ours use individual-level data on NCA
usage: employees who sign NCAs have longer tenure and higher monetary returns to
tenure among a sample of physicians (Lavetti et al 2015 ), and among a nationally
representative survey (Starr et al 2015). Two papers theoretically explore the effects
of liquidity constraints that hinder an employee's ability to buy out of noncompete
agreements (Rauch 2015 and Rauch and Watson 2015), finding that such liquidity
constrains make NCAs lead to inefficiently low levels of entrepreneurship. We add to
the literature by demonstrating how forces external to the firm influence the decision
to use NCAs in the first place. We also conduct the first survey on NCA usage
with employer information, allowing us to explore determinants of NCA usage not
available through employee surveys or variation in enforceability.
This paper also contributes to a literature addressing issues of control within firms.
NCAs allocate control of key assets to production (e.g., human capital, trade secrets,
and client lists) to employers. Following in the tradition of Grossman & Hart (1986),
optimal allocation of control over production assets has been analyzed in a variety of
ways as it relates to characteristics within the firm (e.g., Aghion & Tirole 1997, and
Alonso et al. 2015). More recently, the question of how conditions in the markets in
which firms operate affect their internal organizational and contractual decisions has
begun to be analyzed. Legros & Newman (2008 and 2013) address the question of
how conditions in product markets affect control and integration decisions in firms,
as well as how those decisions affect the market. None of these papers, however, has
addressed how the internal contractual decisions of firms are affected by labor market
conditions.
Section 3.2 describes the model and its testable implications. Section 3.3 describes
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the survey and the resulting dataset. Section 3.4 presents our empirical results, and
Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Model
Our model seeks to address the relationship between labor market characteristics,
minimum wages, and NCAs. Broadly speaking, even when NCAs are inefficient for
an employer/employee pair, they may be used as a means to transfer surplus to
employers when an employee's wage may not be decreased to market clearing levels
due to a minimum wage. This scenario will be more likely when the minimum wage
is higher and also, because the market clearing wage is a function of labor supply,
when labor is plentiful.
This mechanism is illustrated in Figure 3·1, which depicts the Pareto frontiers for
an employer (R) and employee (E) pair if it does or does not use a NCA. In this
case, NCAs lead to a net inefficiency for the pair, depicted by the lower frontier in
the no NCA scenario. In panel (a), wages are unconstrained and utility is thus fully
transferable, and the pair will write a contract that does not include a NCA (the
more efficient contract for the pair). In panel (b), a minimum wage limits the surplus
the R can extract on both frontiers by putting a floor on the wage he can pay. The
minimum wage constrains the surplus R can extract if not using an NCA at a lower
point than if using an NCA. As a result, if the employer is able, he will use a NCA
to increase his share of surplus.
3.2.1 Description of the Model
The model has uncountably many of two types of agents: employers (R) and em-
ployees (E), with associated measures µR and µE, where µE is assumed to be less
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than µR4. R and E form firms in frictionless labor markets. A firm is comprised
of at most one R and one E. When firms are formed, they engage in production
of a consumer good, which sells for an exogenously determined price, P . Employer
i has productivity γ(i). The population distribution of γ is Γ, which has compact
support [γ, γ¯]. Employers are ordered such that γ(i) is decreasing in i (which yields a
continuous, downward sloping labor demand curve). Therefore, the value of produc-
tion of the consumer good to employer i is equal to γ(i)P . Employee productivity is
assumed to be homogeneous, and employees have outside option pi. We assume that
γ(i)P ≥ pi: any R may potentially form a firm with any E that yields greater surplus
than their outside options. Singleton agents, whether they are of type R or E, do not
produce the consumer good.
Contracts written by an R and an E consist of two elements: a wage payment
(w) and, possibly, a NCA (A). The wage may be constrained by a minimum wage,
m, which requires w ≥ m.
If a firm writes a contract with a NCA (A = 1), a positive benefit of B accrues to
R and a positive cost of C is paid by E. B may represent many different elements:
the ability of a firm to make investments in the employee without facing a hold-
up problem, retention of the firm's client list if the employee quits, or protection of
trade secrets, among others. C primarily represents the foregone future employment
opportunities of the employee, but may also include the inability of an employee to
leverage a client list or other assets to garner future wage increases.
R and E are risk neutral. The utility function of Ri (the employer with index i)
who is a member of a firm includes the value of production, the wage payment, and
4The qualitative predictions of the model are unchanged if one assumes that µE is relatively large.
In such a case, predictions which reference changes in µE would instead correspond to changes in
the outside option of the employee, pi. Increases in µE have the same qualitative impact as decreases
in pi.
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the benefit gained from usage of a NCA:
Vi(w,A) = γ(i)P − w + AB
An R who is not a member of a firm receives an outside option normalized to zero.
The utility function of an E who is a member of a firm includes the wage payment
and the cost of a NCA:
W (w,A) = w − AC
An E who is not a member of a firm receives his outside option, pi.
An equilibrium is a set of firms and a contract for each firm, {w,A}, such that
all matches are stable (i.e., there does not exist an R and an E who may form a new
firm with a contract that yields strictly greater utility to one member of the pair and
weakly greater utility to the other member of the pair) and contracts are optimal
(i.e., there does not exist a deviation contract for a firm that yields strictly greater
utility to one member of the pair and weakly greater utility to the other member of
the pair).
3.2.2 Unconstrained Wages
When wages are unconstrained by a minimum wage (m = −∞), utility is fully trans-
ferable, and firms will write contracts efficiently. If the sum of the utility of the
members of a given firm is greater with a NCA than without, then the firm will
write a contract with A = 1. For any potential wages w1 and w0 (the wage under a
contract with a NCA and without, respectively), the sum of utility with a NCA is
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greater when:
Vi(w1, 1) +W (w1, 1) > Vi(w0, 0) +W (w0, 0)
(γ(i)P − w1 +B) + (w1 − C) > (γ(i)P − w0) + w0
B > C
Since B and C are homogenous across R and E, all firms will have NCAs if B > C
and no firms will have NCAs if B < C. In the former case (B > C), the inverse labor
demand curve (for i ≤ µR) is given by:
w(i) = γ(i)P +B,
and the inverse labor supply curve (for i ≤ µE) is given by:
w(i) = pi + C.
With no constraints on wages, and recalling the assumption that employment yields
surplus greater than agents' outside options, all E will be employed, and the market
equilibrium wage will be given by w∗1 = γ(µE)P +B.
When C > B, all E will be employed and the market equilibrium wage is w∗0 =
γ(µE)P .
Figure 3·2 illustrates the labor market in each of these two scenarios. Pictured
are the labor supply and labor demand curves, with and without NCAs, as well
as equilibrium wages. In panel (a), A = 1 in all contracts since B > C, and the
equilibrium wage is w∗1. In panel (b), A = 0 in all contracts since C > B, and the
equilibrium wage is w∗0.
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3.2.3 Constrained Wages
Imposition of a minimum wage eliminates full transferability of utility from E to R,
but does not affect transferability of utility from R to E. When NCAs are efficient
and would be used in an unconstrained world (i.e., when B > C), minimum wages
will not affect NCA usage: since a minimum wage does not constrain a firm's ability
to increase the wage paid to E, it places no limit on R's ability to compensate E for
accepting a NCA.
On the other hand, when NCAs are inefficient (C > B), and are not used in an
unconstrained world, a minimum wage may affect NCA usage if it limits the firm's
ability to pay the unconstrained equilibrium wage, w∗0. Suppose that the minimum
wage is quite high, and binds w∗1: m > γ(µE)P + B. If NCAs were unavailable, the
market wage would be m, and the quantity of labor employed would be i∗m, defined
by m = γ(i∗m)P . Since γ(i
∗
m)P > γ(µE)P , not all E are employed: i
∗
m < µE. In order
for {m, 0} to be an equilibrium contract if NCAs are available, it must be true that
no R prefers to write a contract with a NCA with an E that is unpaired. R prefers
to deviate to {m, 1}, and an unpaired E is willing to accept that contract.
If m > w∗0 and C > B, all equilibrium contracts have A = 1.
First, we expand on the logic of the preceding paragraph to show that, in any
equilibrium, contracts with A = 0 will not exist when m > pi + C − B. Consider
the extreme case in which m > w∗1. In this case, regardless of whether NCAs are
used, there will be a surplus of labor. At most, a measure of E equal to i¯m, defined
by m = γ(¯im)P + B, will be employed. Any R whose contract is {m, 0} will prefer
to write the contract {m, 1} with an unpaired E. An E whose contract is {m, 1}
receives m−C. E prefers this payoff to unemployment since m > w∗1 > pi+C, where
the latter inequality follows from the assumption that firm formation is efficient.
In the case that m ∈ (w∗0, w∗1), all R with γi < γi∗m will not agree to contracts
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with A = 0 and w ≥ m. However, there exist A = 1 contracts that are mutually
beneficial to such R and E that are not paired with R who have relatively large γ,
and such contracts will persist in any equilibrium when m > w∗0. Competition will
drive the wage of contracts with A = 1 to w∗1 in any equilibrium. Now, consider an
R with contract {m, 0}  the most favorable allowable contract for R with A = 0.
There exists a profitable deviation for that R and an E whose contract is {w∗1, 1}:
the contract {w∗1 + ε, 1} for some ε > 0. Therefore, there cannot be an equilibrium,
in this case, in which any contract has A = 0.
It remains to be shown that an equilibrium exists in which all contracts have
A = 1.
We posit an equilibrium in which all firms agree to the contract {w∗1, 1}, all E are
paired, and Ri for i ≤ µE are paired5. The alternative A = 0 contract most favorable
for R is {m, 0}. However, for any Ri who is a member of a firm, such a contract yields
strictly lower utility when
γ(i)P −m < γ(i)P − w∗1 +B
γ(µE)P < m,
which is exactly the condition that w∗0 is bound by m. Thus, no paired R has a
profitable deviation, within her match or with another E.
Therefore, the only deviations left to rule out are deviation contracts which may
be written by a paired E with an unpaired R. Any unpaired R is only able to offer
a deviation contract with A = 0, since any acceptable A = 1 contract would have
w < w∗1. However, since unpaired Ri have i > µE, and m > γ(µE)P , unpaired R are
unwilling to offer the most favorable contract for them: {m, 0}. Thus, no unpaired
R will be able to offer a mutually profitable deviation contract to any E.
5This contract is allowable only if m ≤ w∗1 . In the case that m > w∗1 , the equilibrium contract is
{m, 1}, there exist unpaired E in equilibrium, and the proof is nearly identical.
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Intuitively, Proposition 3.2.3 says firms will leverage a labor surplus to induce Es
to contract with NCAs. Put another way, a minimum wage makes NCAs cheaper
for Rs. The cost of a NCA to the R is the increase to the wage he must pay to induce
E to sign one, which is decreased when the wage paid without a NCA is greater6.
An immediate prediction of Proposition 3.2.3 is that a higher minimum wage will
(weakly) increase the use of NCAs. This result is illustrated in Panel (a) of Figure
3·3. An increase in the minimum wage binds w∗0, resulting in an equilibrium with
NCAs.
Whether the minimum wage binds is also a function of µE and µR, the measures
of E and R in the market. Thus, holding all else equal, shifts in labor supply affect
the use of NCAs for a given m. This is illustrated in Panel (b) of Figure 3·3. An
outward shift in labor supply causes the minimum wage to bind, resulting in a shift
to an equilibrium with NCAs.
Thus, holding all else equal, we may make the following empirical predictions:
Increases in m (the minimum wage) lead to increases in NCA usage.
Outward shifts in labor supply lead to increases in NCA usage.
3.3 Data and Measures
The primary data source for this paper is a survey we conducted of owners of indepen-
dent hair salons in the U.S. in April 2015. We conducted the survey by email via the
Professional Beauty Association (PBA), a trade organization of salon professionals.
The survey asked salon owners about various business, employment, compensation,
and hiring practices, their experience using NCAs, as well as various geographic and
demographic details. We also surveyed individual hair stylists (e.g. workers) sepa-
6When employees are relatively abundant (µE > µR), the cost of a NCA becomes pi + C −m:
the difference between the lowest acceptable wage to an E with a NCA, net of the minimum wage.
NCAs exist in equilibrium with abundant employees when this cost is less than the benefit, B, i.e.,
when the minimum wage is great enough: m > pi + C −B.
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rately, but do not discuss those results in this paper. Individuals who completed the
survey were entered into a rae for one of ten $50 Amazon gift cards.
The PBA emailed its entire list serve, with separate links for owners and for
stylists. The list serve included 26,827 individuals, and PBA estimates 20 percent of
these were salon owners. We received 216 completed surveys, resulting in a response
rate of roughly 4 percent among those receiving an email. However, many of these
email addresses may have been inactive, or otherwise unaware of PBA mailings: only
3,523 individuals opened the email. If the ratio of salon owners among those opening
the email was identical to the ratio on the list serve as a whole, our response rate
among those opening the email would be 216/(3,523*0.20) = 30%. Thus, our true
response rate ranges between 4 and 31 percent. While our response rate is uncertain,
and potentially relatively low, we do not believe it results in selection that biases our
results for a few reasons. First, the survey was advertised as part of a research study
to learn about the use of certain types of business and hiring practices in the salon
industry, and did not mention anything about NCAs explicitly in its advertisement.
Second, the response rate was in line with, if not slightly higher than, prior surveys
PBA had sent out to its members.7
The model in Section 3.2 made empirical predictions regarding the use of NCAs,
shifts in labor supply, and the minimum wage. Here we describe our measures for
each of these items.
To measure use of NCAs, we asked employers whether their most recently hired
stylist signed a NCA and, if not, whether they have ever had a stylist sign a NCA in
the past.
To measure shifts in labor supply, we asked owners for the number of applicants
they received for their most recent vacancy, and whether this number was more, about
the same, or less than they had received for a typical vacancy in the past.
7Private email correspondence by authors with Chelsea MacFarland at PBA on 11/19/2015.
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To measure minimum wage, we use the schedule of each state's minimum wage in
2014 from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Because hair stylists are tipped employees,
we use each state's minimum hourly cash wage for tipped employees. We merged this
dataset into our survey data using each salon's state. A tabulation of the states in
our sample is given in Table A.1.
3.4 Empirical Results
3.4.1 The Minimum Wage and NCA Usage
The first prediction of our model is thatif the cost of a NCA to an employee is
lower than the benefit accruing to the employer NCA usage will be higher when the
minimum wage is higher.
Table 3.2 investigates this relationship. The table reports results from a Linear
Probability Model regression with the dependent variable equal to 1 if the employer
has ever used an NCA, either for its most recently hired stylist or in the past. The
coefficient of interest is that on the Minimum Cash Wage, the 2014 state minimum
wage excluding tips for tipped employees.
Column 1 reports the coefficient on Minimum Cash Wage, controlling only for
the state's Bishara enforcement score. The coefficient is positive but statistically
insignificant. However, minimum wage laws are only applicable to employment-based
salons; independent contractors are not covered by the Fair Labor Standards Act.
Thus, to the extent the minimum wage may bind the equilibrium wage, it could only
do so for employment-based salons.
Column 2 controls for an employment-based dummy and a series of additional
covariates correlated with NCA usage: the percent of a salon's stylists hired right out
of school, a dummy for employment-based salons, annual revenue from the previous
year, the owner's number of years in the beauty industry, and the number of salons
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in a respondent's county.8 Here, the coefficient on Minimum Cash Wage increases by
56 percent and is significant at the 5% level (p=.021).
To further test the prediction that the minimum wage only serves as a constraint
for employment-based salons, Columns 3 and 4 split the sample into employment-
based and contractor salons, respectively. The results show that the effect of the
minimum wage on NCA usage is entirely driven by employment-based salons: a one
dollar increase in the minimum wage is associated with a 7.9 percentage point increase
(p<.01) in the likelihood an owner uses NCAs among employment-based salons. On
the other hand, the minimum wage has a tiny and statistically insignificant effect
for owners of contractor-based salons, suggesting the observed effect of the minimum
wage is not driven by some latent unobserved variable correlated with the minimum
wage.
3.4.2 Shifts in Labor Supply and NCA Usage
A second prediction of our model is thatin the presence of liquidity constraintsshifts
in labor supply affect the usage of NCAs. Table 3.3 tests this prediction.
Columns 1 and 2 investigate the cross-sectional relationship between whether a
stylist signs an NCA and the number of applicants the owner received for the position.
We run an Linear Probability Model regression with the dependent variable equal to
1 if the most recently hired stylist signed a NCA, and we report the coefficient on the
variable equal to the number of applicants the employer received for the position.9
Each specification controls for the state's Bishara enforceability score. Column 2
8Because we had many covariates we thought might be relevant to our analysis, we ran the
risk of over-fitting the data by including all of them. Instead, we selected this set of covariates by
running a LASSO regression (which effectively penalizes too many parameters) with the dependent
variable equal to 1 if the most recently hired stylist signed a NCA, and a variety of regressors. These
covariates are those which survived the LASSO (except for number of salons in the owner's county,
which did not survive but is highly correlated with the Minimum Wage).
9Note we use this as our dependent variable, rather than a dummy for whether the employer has
ever used an NCA. Whereas the minimum wage affects all hiring decisions, not just the most recent
one, our predictions on the number of applicants only affects the most recent hire.
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includes the same additional covariates included in Table 3.2: the percent of a salon's
stylists hired right out of school, a dummy for employment-based salons, annual
revenue from the previous year, the owner's number of years in the beauty industry,
and the number of salons in a respondent's county.
Column 1 shows that one additional applicant for a position is associated with
a 1.2 percentage point increase in the probability the hired stylist signed an NCA,
or 4 percent of the sample mean.10 The coefficient shrinks by small amount but
remains highly statistically significant when we add controls in Column 2. To put
this magnitude in perspective, the sample standard deviation of number of applicants
for the most recent vacancy is 9.4, suggesting a one standard deviation increase in
number of applicants is associated with a roughly 27 percentage point increase in the
probability the hired stylist signed an NCA.
Even though the covariates we add in Column 2 arguably control for the most
likely sources of potential omitted variable bias affecting the coefficient on Number of
Applicants, it is still possible the correlation between NCA usage and applicants could
be driven by an unobserved variable. Thus, Columns 3 and 4 investigate the effects
of change in the number of applicants an owner gets for a position on the change in
its usage of NCAs. Now, we restrict the sample to owners who reported using NCAs
at least once, and the dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if the employer
did not have its most recently hired stylist sign an NCA.
Column 3 shows that, among employers who have ever used NCAs, those that
received fewer applicants than usual for their most recent vacancy were 4 percentage
points more likely to have stopped using NCAs, though the result is not statistically
significant. If, on the other hand, the employer received more applicants for its most
recent position than usual, it is 14 percentage points less likely to have stopped using
NCAs, though again the coefficient is not statistically significant (p=0.16). These
10We get similar results using a logit or probit specification.
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results, while not quite statistically significant, suggest changes in our measure of
labor supply also lead to within-owner changes in the use of NCAs.
Our model yields a slightly more subtle prediction regarding an interaction effect
between the minimum wage and the number of applicants: the higher the minimum
wage, the more likely an outward shift in labor supply results in an equilibrium wage
w∗0 that exceeds m.Table C.0.2 tests this prediction. The sample is restricted to
employment-based salons, and the dependent variable is a dummy for whether the
most recently hired stylist signed an NCA. Column 1 includes both the number of
applicants and the Minimum Wage, and Column 3 also includes their interaction
effect. As can be seen in Column 2, the inclusion of the interaction of applicants
and the Minimum Wage drives their main effects to shrink in magnitude and lose
statistical significance. The interaction term itself is positive, as predicted by our
model, and nearly statistically significant (p-value=0.11). These results, while likely
underpowered, provide further evidence supporting our model.
3.4.3 NCA Usage and the Hold-Up Problem
Together, the implications of the model in Section 3.2 and the empirical findings in
Section 3.4 suggest that changes in the labor market affect NCA suage, even when
their use might be pairwise inefficient. However, there are many reasons to believe
NCAs can be pairwise efficiency enhancing. By effectively assigning control rights
to transferable assets to the employer, NCAs may mitigate hold-up problems that
distort incentives for the employer to invest in these assets (Lavetti et al 2015, Starr
2016).
To investigate, in our survey we asked salon owners about the extent to which they
invest in two types of transferable assets essential to production for hair salons: client
attraction and on-the-job-training. For client attraction, we asked owners whether
they did any of the following to attract clients: have a website, have a social media
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account, give offers on daily deal sites (e.g. Groupon), maintain a client email list
serve with regular promotions, or some other type of marketing. For training, we
asked whether the owner's salon provided on-the-job training for newly hired stylists.
We run a series of regressions with the dependent variable equal to one if the owner
indicated engaging in each corresponding type of investment, on the Ever Used NCA
dummy, the Bishara score, and our other set of controls from previous tables. Be-
cause the decision to make these investments and use NCAs is a joint decision, these
regressions should be interpreted as correlations rather than causal.
The results are shown in Table 3.4. Columns 1-5 display results for each of the five
outcomes related to client attraction. The coefficient on Ever Used NCA is positive
for all but one form of client attraction (social media), and is statistically significant
for Deal Sites and for List Servewhich are very likely the two most costly forms
of client attraction in the group (and thus most affected by the hold-up problem).
In Column 6, we create a new outcome variable equal to the sum of the responses
to the five client attraction questions. The coefficient here is large and statistically
significant: owners that use NCAs engage in roughly 16 percent more overall client
attraction (0.42/2.6, p=.03).
Column 7 gives the results for the outcome variable concerning on-the-job-training.
The coefficient of 0.12 on Ever Used NCA is highly significant, suggesting salons that
use NCAs are 15% more likely to provide training to new workers than those which
do not, consistent with findings by Starr et al 2015.
These results, while not necessarily causal, support the idea that NCAs can indeed
be efficiency-enhancing by improving employers' incentives to invest in transferable
assets valuable to production.
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3.4.4 Reconciling the Findings: Moderating Role of Banking Relation-
ships
The empirical results from the previous two sections appear at first to contradict each
other. On the one hand, based on the implications of our model, our results showing
the minimum wage and shifts in labor supply affect NCA usage suggest NCAs are
pairwise inefficient. On the other hand, the relationship between NCA usage and
investment in transferable assets suggest NCAs could potentially have substantial
efficiency-enhancing properties. In this section, we conduct exploratory analysis to
reconcile these findings.
It is possible, and indeed likely, that the benefits of NCA usage are heterogeneous
across employers. One potentially important source of heterogeneity is employers'
capacity to make investments in transferable assets. An insight from the corporate
finance literature is that financing constraints can limit an employer's ability to make
valuable investments (Fazzari et al 1988; De Mel et al 2008). Such constraints may
lead to less potential investment to be held-up, limiting the potential benefits of
NCAs.
To measure the extent to which an employer is financially constrained from making
investments, we asked employers Do you have a line of credit or other ongoing banking
relationship you use to finance cash outlays? Access to lines of credit have been
shown to be a statistically powerful measure of financial constraints, by alleviating
capital market frictions to ensure funds are available to firms for valuable investments
(Sufi 2009). Thus, if owners with access to a line of credit have higher capacity for
investment, they also likely have more to gain from using NCAs.11
If owners with a banking relationship have more to gain using NCAs, then our
11In unreported results, we find salons with access to lines of credit have statistically significantly
higher rates of investment in client attraction and training. While this relationship is not necessarily
causal, it is consistent with lines of credit alleviating constraints that limit ability to make such
investments.
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model in Section 3.2 predicts that, all else equal, owners with a banking relationship
will a) be more likely to use NCAs, and b) their usage will be less affected by the
minimum wage and labor market conditions. Indeed, if the benefit of NCAs to owners
with a line of credit is high enough to be pairwise efficient (B > C), labor market
conditions will have exactly no effect on their usage.
Table 3.5 tests these predictions by reporting results that analyze how access to
bank credit affects NCA usage, and how it moderates the relationship between NCA
usage, labor supply, and the minimum wage. In Columns 1-3, the dependent variable
is a dummy equal to 1 if the most recently hired stylist signed a NCA. Column 1
shows that, holding other covariates constant, owners with a banking relationship are
14 percentage points more likely to use NCAs. The coefficient is essentially unchanged
when we control for number of applicants received for the position (Column 2).
Column 3 includes an interaction term of banking relationship with number of
applicants. if the benefit of NCAs for those employers with a banking relationship is
large enough, then changes in labor supply should have no effect on their use. The re-
sults in Column 3 strongly support this prediction: the main effect of Num Applicants
(.017) and the interaction term with Banking Relationship (-.016) completely cancel
each other out. Furthermore, the main effect on Num Applicants shows that the
effect of labor supply on NCA usage is much stronger for owners without a banking
relationship (0.016 vs. 0.009 for the whole sample), and the main effect of banking
relationship on NCA usage is almost twice as high for owners without any applicants
for their most recent position (0.26) compared to the whole sample (0.15, Column 2).
In Columns 4-6, the dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if the owner has
ever used NCAs. Column 4 shows a coefficient on Banking Relationship essentially
identical to Column 1 (when the dependent variable is a dummy if the most recently
hired stylist signed one), and the coefficient is unchanged by controlling for the state's
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Minimum Wage. Column 3 includes an interaction of Banking Relationship with
the minimum wage. The interaction term, nearly statistically significant (p=.12),
suggests the effect of the Minimum Wage on NCA usage is 60 percent smaller for
owners with a banking relationship compared to those without one (-.061-.036=-.025,
compared to -.061). Strikingly, the main effect of Banking Relationship increases to
almost to (0.29), almost identical to the magnitude in Column 3.
3.5 Conclusion
Noncompete agreements are part of a large and growing share of employment rela-
tionships in the U.S., and questions over their rationale, effects and efficiency have
made NCAs a controversial topic among policymakers.12 This paper shows NCAs
may arise for reasons unrelated to their efficiency  or even despite their inefficiency.
We develop a simple model with the implication that, when workers and employers
are constrained in their ability to use monetary transfers to equilibrate labor mar-
kets, NCAs may arise as a non-pecuniary tool to transfer surplus from employees to
employers. Such constraints can only affect NCA usage if NCAs are not used in an
unconstrained world, which they will not be if the employee's cost of an NCA exceeds
the employer's benefit.
Using a new survey of salon owners in the high-end beauty industry, we find strong
empirical evidence that constraints on monetary transfers (in the form of a minimum
wage) and shifts in labor supply have statistically significant and economically mean-
ingful effects on NCA usage, consistent with NCAs being pairwise inefficient. These
results provide some of the first evidence that changes to the external labor market
affect internal organizational decisions of firms, via allocation of ownership.
12See for example a 2016 report from the Office of Economic Policy at the U.S.
Treasury: https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/economic-policy/Documents/UST%20Non-
competes%20Report.pdf.
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At the same time, we present empirical evidence consistent with prior theoreti-
cal and empirical work that NCAs have the potential to be efficiency enhancing by
improving employers' incentives to invest in transferable assets. Salon owners in our
sample that use NCAs invest significantly more in attracting clients and in training
their workers. To reconcile these findings, we posit the benefit of an NCA to an em-
ployer is increasing in her capacity to make investments and, building from insights
in the corporate finance literature, that this capacity is higher for employers with
access to a line of credit or other banking relationship. We find both that NCA usage
is both significantly higher, and the minimum wage and labor supply have little to
no effect on their use, for this subsample. These findings suggest both the benefits
and efficiencyof NCAs are heterogeneous, even within a singular narrowly-defined
industry.
One implication of our findings is that, if a change in the minimum wage leads
to a change in NCA usage in a certain occupation, NCAs are pairwise inefficient in
that occupation. It does not necessarily follow that NCAs in this scenario are socially
inefficient. The reason is that when NCAs are pairwise inefficient, but a minimum
wage makes it optimal for employers to use NCAs, the equilibrium quantity of labor
employed will be strictly higher than it would if NCAs were unavailable. However,
there are other reasons to believe NCAs will not be socially efficient if they are pairwise
inefficient, for example by depressing levels of entrepreneurship (Rauch and Watson
2014, Samila and Sorenson 2011 ).
In a coarse sense, NCAs are particularly likely to be inefficient in industries and
occupations in which wages are most affected by the minimum wage. This finding
supports the rationale for a bill proposed in the U.S. Senate in 2015, the Mobility
and Opportunity for Vulnerable Employees (MOVE) Act13, which would prohibit
employers from requiring low-wage workers to sign NCAs.
13See http://www.franken.senate.gov/files/documents/150604MOVEsummary.pdf
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This paper also highlights a potentially unintended consequence of minimum wage
laws, as our results suggest a higher minimum wage leads to an increased use of NCAs.
Many papers have sought to estimate the effects of the minimum wage on employment
and wages. Our results highlight that adjustment to non-pecuniary compensation is a
previously unexplored lever employers can use in response to minimum wage changes.
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Figure 3·1: Even if R and E attain more joint surplus on the Pareto
frontier with no NCA (when B < C), when constrained they may
contract on the frontier with a NCA.
(a) Unconstrained Pareto frontiers for an employer/employee pair
Min Wage, 
no NCA 
Min Wage, 
NCA 
(b) Constrained Pareto frontiers for an employer/employee pair
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Figure 3·2: The efficiency of NCAs, determined by the benefit (B)
versus the cost (C), determines NCA usage, the wage, and the level of
employment.
B"
C"
(a) An unconstrained market in which NCAs are pairwise efficient (B > C) and therefore
used in equilibrium
B"
C"
(b) An unconstrained market in which NCAs are pairwise inefficient (B < C) and therefore
not used in equilibrium
115
Figure 3·3: Even when NCAs are inefficient (B < C), they may exist
in equilibrium when the minimum wage is greater than the equilibrium
wage.
(a) An upward shift in the minimum wage from m to m′ induces NCA usage.
(b) An increase in labor supply from µE to µ
′
E induces NCA usage.
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics
n mean sd median min max
Last Hire Signed NCA 218 0.30 0.46 0.00 0.00 1.00
Ever used NCA 218 0.39 0.49 0.00 0.00 1.00
Num stylists employed 217 7.14 8.82 4.00 0.00 52.00
Salon 2014 annual revenue, 000s 217 379.76 391.29 250.00 25.00 1500.00
% of stylists hired out of school 217 42.39 36.73 32.85 5.00 95.00
Appointment only 218 0.32 0.47 0.00 0.00 1.00
Years in beauty industry 217 27.39 13.32 27.00 1.00 59.00
Emp contract: employee 218 0.48 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00
Bishara State NCA score, standardized 217 0.62 0.33 0.77 0.07 1.00
Ongoing banking relationship 218 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00
Num applicants for last vacancy 195 6.79 9.37 4.00 0.00 60.00
Number of applicants fewer than usual 218 0.31 0.46 0.00 0.00 1.00
Number of applicants same as usual 218 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00
Number of applicants more than usual 218 0.10 0.30 0.00 0.00 1.00
Num beauty salons in county, 2012 216 388.91 499.79 183.50 1.00 1762.00
Variable means with standard deviations in parentheses. Revenue, Number of Applicants, and
Number of Salons in County topcoded at 99th percentile.
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Table 3.2: The Relationship Between The Minimum Wage and NCA Usage
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DV = has ever used NCA
whole sample emp-based non-emp
salons salons
Minimum Cash Wage 0.027 0.043 0.079 0.025
(0.020) (0.019)** (0.026)*** (0.027)
Emp contract: employee 0.29
(0.073)***
Observations 217 216 104 112
R2 0.040 0.129 0.162 0.066
Mean Dep Var 0.382 0.384 0.529 0.250
Bishara Score Y Y Y Y
Other Controls N Y Y Y
The dependent variable is a dummy if the employer has ever had an
employee sign a NCA.
The samples in Columns 3 and 4 are restricted to salons which are
employment-based and not employment-based (i.e. independent con-
tractors), respectively.
Bishara score is a standardized measure of each state's enforceability
of NCAs.
Other controls include the percent of a salon's stylists hired right out
of school, a dummy for employmnent-based salons, annual revenue
from the previous year, the number of years the owner has been in the
beauty industry, and the number of salons in a respondent's county.
Linear Probability Model. Robust SEs in parentheses. ***P<.01.,
**P<.05, *P<.1
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Table 3.3: The Relationship Between Shifts in Labor Supply and NCA Usage
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DV = last hire DV = last hire did not
signed NCA sign, but used in past
Num applicants for last vacancy 0.012 0.0086
(0.0038)***(0.0039)**
Number of applicants fewer than usual 0.040
(0.11)
Number of applicants more than usual -0.14
(0.10)
Observations 195 194 76 76
R2 0.099 0.157 0.123 0.127
Mean Dep Var 0.303 0.304 0.224 0.224
Bishara Score Y Y Y Y
Other Controls N Y Y Y
The dependent variable in Columns 1 and 2 is a dummy equual to 1 if the most recently
hired stylist signed a NCA.
The sample in Columns 3 and 4 is restricted to owners who reported using NCAs at
least once prior to their most recent hire. The dependent variable is a dummy if the
employer did not have their most recently hired stylist sign a NCA.
Number of applicants more (less) is a dummy if the number of applicants the em-
ployer received for its most recent vacancy was more (less) than it received for similar
vacancies in the past.
Bishara score is a standardized measure of each state's enforceability of NCAs.
Other controls include the percent of a salon's stylists hired right out of school, a
dummy for employmnent-based salons, annual revenue from the previous year, the
number of years the owner has been in the beauty industry, and the number of salons
in a respondent's county.
Linear Probability Model. Robust SEs in parentheses. ***P<.01., **P<.05, *P<.1
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Table 3.4: The Relationship Between NCA Usage and the Hold-up Problem
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Outcomes related to investment in client attraction
Social Web- Deal List Other Sum of Trains
Media site sites serve Marketing marketing workers
Ever used NCA -0.0056 0.093 0.12 0.13 0.085 0.42 0.12
(0.057) (0.061) (0.054)** (0.066)* (0.070) (0.19)** (0.044)***
Observations 216 216 216 216 216 216 216
R2 0.103 0.145 0.052 0.199 0.038 0.203 0.298
Mean Dep Var 0.810 0.722 0.116 0.588 0.366 2.602 0.796
Bishara Score yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Other Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
The dependent variable in each column is a dummy for whether the employer indicated
using the corresponding tool. Columns 1-5 are tools to attract clients, and Column 6 is a
simple sum of the responses from Columns 1-5.
Bishara score is a standardized measure of each state's enforceability of NCAs.
Other controls include the percent of a salon's stylists hired right out of school, a dummy
for employmnent-based salons, annual revenue from the previous year, the number of years
the owner has been in the beauty industry, and the number of salons in a respondent's
county.
Linear Probability Model. Robust SEs in parentheses. ***P<.01., **P<.05, *P<.1
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Table 3.5: The Moderating Effect of Banking Relationship on NCA Usage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DV = last hire signed NCA DV = any hire signed NCA
Ongoing banking relationship 0.14 0.15 0.26 0.12 0.11 0.29
(0.062)** (0.061)** (0.072)***(0.066)* (0.066)* (0.14)**
Num applicants for last vacancy 0.0089 0.016
(0.0042)** (0.0030)***
Ongoing banking relationship=1 × Num applicants for last vacancy -0.017
(0.0060)***
Minimum Cash Wage 0.042 0.061
(0.019)** (0.022)***
Ongoing banking relationship=1 × Minimum Cash Wage -0.036
(0.023)
Observations 194 194 194 216 216 216
R2 0.152 0.181 0.209 0.121 0.140 0.150
Mean Dep Var 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.384 0.384 0.384
Bishara Score Y Y Y Y Y Y
Other Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Bishara score is a standardized measure of each state's enforceability of NCAs.
Other controls include the percent of a salon's stylists hired right out of school, a dummy for employmnent-based salons, annual
revenue from the previous year, the number of years the owner has been in the beauty industry, and the number of salons in a
respondent's county.
Linear Probability Model. Robust SEs in parentheses. ***P<.01., **P<.05, *P<.1
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Table A.0.1: Results using rdrobust package
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Viols Penalties
RD_Estimate -0.745 -0.426
Observations 4088 4588
Robust 95% CI [-1.23 ; -.29] [-.8 ; -.1]
Kernel Type Triangular Triangular
Robust Std. Error 0.241 0.178
Robust p-value 0.00155 0.0122
Order Loc. Poly. (p) 1 1
BW Loc. Poly. (h) 11683 12686
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Table A.0.2: General deterrence regressions: which types of violations are most
affected by press releases
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Type of Violation Distribution of Violations
# total # OSH # high hazard Total # Total # Total #
viols viols viols viols > 0 viols > 2 viols > 5
Post inspection of peer with Pen≥ c -1.03 -0.96 -0.30 -0.12 -0.12 -0.088
(0.27)** (0.26)** (0.13)* (0.051)* (0.048)* (0.027)**
Obs 3270 3270 3270 3270 3270 3270
Control Mean 2.25 2.13 0.67 0.69 0.31 0.11
OSH violations are of standards specifically under an Occupational Safety and Health category. High-gravity
violations are those with gravity 10 (out of a 1-10 scale), which means the violations is most likely to result in
severe incidence.
Peer groups are defined as all workplaces sharing the same industry and zip code. All regressions use a
bandwidth around the press release cutoff of 10,000 and include a construction dummy and focal year and
region fixed effects. The running variable is the largest penalty issued in a peer group between May 2009 and
the previous month. The sample period is restricted to June 2009-Dec 2012 and to peer groups whose running
variable is between May 2009 and Dec 2011. Regions 2 and 3 not included.
Each coefficient is estimated in a separate regression which controls linearly for P(max) with different slopes
on each side of the cutoff. Robust standard errors clustered by peer group +P<.1, *P<.05, **P<.01.
For OSHA regions 5, 7 and 8, the relevant cutoff is 45,000, and for all others it is 40,000. Count variables
topcoded at 99th percentiles.
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Table A.0.3: Sensitivity of general deterrence regressions to different bandwidths
and polynomials in the running variable
(1) (2) (3)
window around c
5000 10000 15000
Degree of polynomial in running variable
1st (linear)
Post inspection of peer with Pen≥ c -0.95 -1.03 -0.73
(0.36)** (0.27)** (0.21)**
Obs 1543 3270 5947
2nd (quadratic)
Post inspection of peer with Pen≥ c -1.13 -0.87 -1.04
(0.53)* (0.40)* (0.31)**
Obs 1543 3270 5947
3rd (cubic)
Post inspection of peer with Pen≥ c -0.76 -0.79 -0.86
(0.69) (0.52) (0.40)*
Obs 1543 3270 5947
Peer groups are defined as all workplaces sharing the same in-
dustry and zip code. All regressions include a construction
dummy and focal year and region fixed effects. The running
variable is the largest penalty issued in a peer group between
May 2009 and the previous month. The sample period is re-
stricted to June 2009-Dec 2012 and to peer groups whose run-
ning variable is between May 2009 and Dec 2011. Regions 2
and 3 not included.
Each coefficient is estimated in a separate regression which
controls linearly for P(max) with different slopes on each side
of the cutoff. Robust standard errors clustered by peer group
+P<.1, *P<.05, **P<.01.
For OSHA regions 5, 7 and 8, the relevant cutoff is 45,000, and
for all others it is 40,000. Count variables topcoded at 99th
percentiles.
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Figure A.0.1: The Effect of a Press Release on Later Inspections of
the Publicized Workplace
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(b) Other Inspections
The left panel shows the number of future inspections triggered by a complaint,
referral or accident, by the financial penalties levied at a previous inspection
occurring between May 2009-Dec 2011.The right panel shows the number of later
programmed and follow-up inspections. Each dot corresponds to an average over
$2,500. The continuous lines represent quadratic polynomials fitted separately on
each side of the cutoff. Sample period is May 2009- Dec 2012, and excludes
state-plan states and Regions 2 and 3.
Figure A.0.2: The Effect of a Press Release on Subsequent
Compliance of the Publicized Workplace
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The left panel shows the number of violations found, and the right panel the
financial penalties, in an inspection of a workplace, by the financial penalties
levied at a previous inspection occurring between May 2009-Dec 2011. Each dot
corresponds to an average over $2,500. The continuous lines represent quadratic
polynomials fitted separately on each side of the cutoff. Sample period is May
2009- Dec 2012, and excludes state-plan states and Regions 2 and 3.
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Figure A.0.3: The Effect of a Press Release on Number of
Inspections in the Publicized Workplace's Peer Group
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The left panel shows the number of inspections in a peer group following its focal
date, by the group's "focal penalty," or the highest penalty levied at a previous
inspection of any member of the peer group beginning May 2009. Peer groups are
defined based on shared sector (as tabulated in Table 1.1) and zip code. Each dot
corresponds to an average over a $2,500 bandwidth of focal penalty, with 90%
confidence intervals included. The continuous lines represent quadratic
polynomials fitted separately on each side of the cutoff. Sample period is May
2009- Dec 2012, and excludes state-plan states and Regions 2 and 3.
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B.1 Validity of ODI-reported Injury Rates
Because our measures of injuries are self-reported by establishments to OSHA in the
ODI data, one concern is misreporting of injuries.
There is very likely classical measurement error (i.e., pure noise) in these measures.
In addition, there is evidence that injuries reported to ODI (or other surveys) are
typically an undercount of the true number of injuries. There are many factors that
could explain this divergence, but two primary ones are the employees may not report
some injuries to supervisors, and employers may not report some injuries to OSHA
(see Azaroff et al 2002 for a thorough discussion of these factors). Employees are
more likely to report injuries to supervisors when the injury is more serious, when
workers' compensation benefit levels are more generous, and when the worker is older
(Biddle and Roberts 2003). Conditional on employee reporting, employers are more
likely to report injuries on an OSHA log if the employer is larger (Dong et al 2011)
and if the injury is more serious (Boden et al 2010).1
As long as this measurement error in injury reporting is unaffected by OSHA
1A few studies have compared the Bureau of Labor Statistics' Survey on Occupational Injuries
and Illnesses (SOII) to workers' compensation data to estimate the reliability of data collected by the
SOII. While the SOII is distinct from ODI, its format is quite similar and both rely on employers' logs
of OSHA-recordable injuries; thus, lessons from these studies probably apply to ODI. A consistent
finding is that injuries which are more acute and easier to diagnose are reported quite accurately in
the BLS survey (such as amputations). The BLS surveys have under-reporting for chronic injuries
such as carpal tunnel syndrome, injuries that are more difficult to diagnose injuries such as hearing
less, and occupational illnesses (Nestoriak and Pierce 2009; Ruser 2008).
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inspections, it will increase the standard errors of our estimates but not bias them.
More worrisome is that inspection may increase the accuracy of self-reported injuries
(for example, if OSHA issues recordkeeping violations that motivate employers to
keep more complete records of injuries). Thus, even if inspections truly lead to lower
injuries, this effect would bias regression estimates towards inspections increasing
injuries reported to the ODI.
The extent of such bias is unobservable, but we address this concern in several
ways. First, our primary outcome is serious injuries (i.e., those involving days away
from work), for which the scope for measurement error is typically smaller than for
total injuries (Boden et al 2010). Furthermore, there is evidence smaller establish-
ments are particularly prone to under-reporting injuries. Because the ODI survey
includes only establishments with at least 40 employees (or 20 as of 2009), this re-
striction of relatively large employers should mitigate the extent of under-reporting.
Still, we restrict part of the analysis to particularly large establishments. Finally, as
a robustness check we can exclude from our analysis establishments that OSHA ever
cited for a recordkeeping violation (roughly 12 percent of Treatments and 8 percent
of Controls in our analysis sample).
Finally, measurement error in ODI-reported injuriesat least for those injuries
reported by employeesmay not be a significant concern in practice. Messiou and
Zaidman (2005) compared establishment-level workers' compensation data to ODI-
reported data in 2003 andwhile differences between the two sources existedthey did
not find systematic under-reporting of injuries to ODI. Furthermore, OSHA routinely
audits a random sample of ODI respondents to verify the accuracy of their ODI
responses by comparing ODI responses to the establishment's OSHA log forms; in
2006, 96 percent of those audited were classified with accurate recordkeeping (OSHA
Office of Statistical Analysis 2009). These audits are accompanied by large fines if the
128
establishment is found to be inaccurate. The threat of such audits provides employers
incentives to report accurately to ODI.2
B.2 Pre-specification
We pre-specified our design in several phases, and we posted our plans to the Open
Science Framework.
The first version, which we posted in July 2015, gave the basic outline of the study,
our primary outcome variables, and our planned empirical specification to estimate
the baseline overall effects of inspections. We also uploaded the Stata code we would
run to estimate our regressions, so that we pre-specified to the level of the Stata code.
After posting this plan, we found several minor glitches in our pre-specified design
that we updated over the next months. For example, because we initially believed
a large share of Controls in one year would become Treatments in later years, we
originally planned to estimate the effects of inspections using outcomes within a
window of three years before and after the focal year. However, while creating our
analysis sample, we learned this crossover of Controls was not as large as we thought,
and that our power would increase if we estimated outcomes using a window of
four years before and after the focal year. Unfortunately, we neglected to update
the pre-analysis plan to reflect this intention. As another example, we pre-specified
our preferred In one specification we had written employment, when we intended
ln(employment), as a covariate, for example.
Additionally, after specifying our original analysis sample in our Pre-Analysis
Plan, we learned of some unique features of the SST Program in 2002 and 2003 which
2OSHA also performed several hundred detailed audits from 2009-2010 targeting establishments
reporting low DART rates (0-4.2) or medium DART rates (4.3-8) to assess the accuracy of their
ODI-reported injury rates. Their report found higher under-reporting among the low-rate estab-
lishments, and relatively little under-reporting among the mid-rate establishments (OSHA Office
of Statistical Analysis 2013). Because the establishments on the SST Target Lists are those reporting
the highest injury rates, these results reduce our concerns over accuracy.
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we were not initially aware of, but which upon learning realized were important to
incorporate into our analysis. We also made some improvements to our fuzzy-linking
between the SST Target Lists and IMIS, which slightly changed our analysis sample.
To reflect these changes, we included an update to our initial pre-analysis plan,
which we uploaded to OSF in January 2016.
B.3 Candidate predictors of DAFW count, shirking and sector
danger in Optimal Targeting Model
Dependent variable is log(DAFW count+1)
For all variables, if the variable is missing we replace it with the sample mean.
For variables marked with a (*), we include a dummy equal to one if the variable is
non-missing
Sector variables
• hours and hours2, lagged 2 years *
• hours and hours2, lagged 1 year *
• 3-digit SIC Leave-one-out mean DAFW rate, lagged 1 and 2 years
• State Leave-one-out mean DAFW rate, lagged 1 and 2 years
• 3 digit SIC Leave-one-out mean Transfer or Restriction rate, lagged 1 and 2
years
• State Leave-one-out mean Transfer or Restriction rate, lagged 1 and 2 years
• 3-digit SIC Leave-one-out mean Other recordable injury rate, lagged 1 and 2
years
• State Leave-one-out mean Other recordable injury rate, lagged 1 and 2 years
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• Dummy for Manufacturing, dummy for nursing homes
Shirking variables
• Compliance-related
 Dummy if linked to IMIS
 Sum of total violations over all inspections in a calendar year (=0 if no
inspections), lagged 1, 2, 3 years (separately)
 Sum of total gravity over all inspections in a calendar year (=0 if no in-
spections), lagged 1, 2, 3 years (separately)
 Dummy if any repeat or willful violation in any inspection in previous 3
years
 Number of complaint inspections in a calendar year, lagged 1, 2, 3 years
 Number of catastrophe inspections in a calendar year, lagged 1, 2, 3 years
 Number of other inspections in a calendar year, lagged 1, 2, 3 years
• Establishment characteristics
 Establishment age and age2, NETS, lagged 2 years *
 Indicators for standalone, public, foreign owned, women owned, lagged 2
years *
 Minimum PAYDEX score, lagged 1 and 2 years*
 Ln(NETS sales), lagged 1 and 2 years *
 Indicator for union ever present in an OSHA inspection (equal to 0 if
inspected but never a union present, or if not linked to IMIS)
• Related to injuries and ODI variables
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 DAFW injury rate, lagged 1, 2 and 3 years *
 Transfer/restriction injury rate, lagged 1, 2 and 3 years *
 Other recordable injury rate, lagged 1, 2 and 3 years *
 Number of Days Away From Work, lagged 1, 2 and 3 years *
 Number of Days Restricted or Transferred, lagged 1, 2 and 3*
 Indicator for has ODI data in t-1
 Indicator for has ODI data in t-3
 From ODI: any deaths, shutdowns, strikes, seasonal work, natural disas-
ters, long work schedules, any illnesses, lagged 1 and 2 years *
• Interacted variables
 DAFW, transfer/restricted, and other recordable injury rate from t-2, in-
teracted with indicator for has ODI data in t-1
 DAFW rate from t-2, interacted with dummies for 4 employment quartiles
(from NETS) in t-2.
Eventually, we may include more variables if we can, such as number of EPA violations
in previous year, etc
B.4 Appendix Tables and Figures
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Table B.4.1: Pipeline process from raw SST Target Lists to creating our analysis sample
Primary List Secondary List
Treatment Control Treatment Control
# % of # % of # % of # % of
total total total total
Total on SST lists 23364 100.0 14848 100.0 8781 100.0 55144 100.0
Federal OSHA states only a 20708 88.6 13314 89.7 7455 84.9 50349 91.3
Restrict to Area-Years which randomized lists
Primary list started but not exhausted b 8336 35.7 9907 66.7 . . . .
Primary exhausted, Secondary started but not exhausted b . . . . 4390 50.0 6425 11.7
Restrict to establishments eligible for SST inspection
Not subject to deletion criteria c 6743 28.9 7554 50.9 3496 39.8 4422 8.0
Drop establishments targeted for concerns of ODI quality
Has non-missing ODI data in focal year d 6520 27.9 7296 49.1 3397 38.7 4293 7.8
DART/DAFW meets selection criteria for corresponding list d 6079 26.0 6926 46.6 3263 37.2 4153 7.5
Cross checks that establishments exist
Found in NETS 5991 25.6 6823 46.0 3231 36.8 4111 7.5
Alive in year t-2 [NETS] e 5660 24.2 6444 43.4 3102 35.3 3953 7.2
Alive in year t-1 [NETS] f 5599 24.0 6382 43.0 3078 35.1 3923 7.1
Final Steps for Analysis Sample
Drop Nursing Homes in 2002 g 5539 23.7 6139 41.3 3078 35.1 3870 7.0
Treatment's SST Cycle is opened h 5181 22.2 6139 41.3 3007 34.2 3870 7.0
Focal DART, emp, hours in Common Support 5180 22.2 6131 41.3 3005 34.2 3861 7.0
Area-Year has at least one T and C left (Analysis sample) 4514 19.3 5494 37.0 2542 28.9 3732 6.8
Treatments are those with SST Status = Selected or Completed, and Controls have Status = Available.
a Excludes 2 states with state-run OSHA offices.
b Restricts to Area/Year a) primary lists with strictly between .05 and .95 establishments Available, or b) secondary list with 0% of
primary Available, and strictly between .05 and .95 of secondary Available.
c An establishment is subject to deletion if, within 2 or 3 years prior to cycle start date (depending on before/after 2009 SST directive),
it had an inspection coded as a) comprehensive safety inspection, b) records-only, or c) is nursing home and focused inspection.
d A random sample of establishments that do not respond to the ODI survey as well as a random sample of establishments reporting
very low injury rates in high-rate industries, are placed on the Target List each year to assess the reliability of their reported data.
e Drops establishments for which the last year in NETS is earlier than two years prior to the focal year.
f Drops establishments not alive the year prior to the focal year, as such establishments were ineligible for SST inspection.
g The 2002 SST Directive excluded nursing homes.
h An SST cycle is opened if at least 5% of eligible establishments in the cycle show up with an SST inspection in the directive year
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Table B.4.2: ITT Effects of SST Inspection on Injuries using ANCOVA specification
(1) (2) (3) (4)
SST DAFW Injury Count
insp-
ected
Treated 0.46 -0.032 -0.028 -0.034
(0.0064)** (0.017)+ (0.016)+ (0.016)*
ln(Average number of working hours) 0.44 0.49
(0.013)** (0.016)**
ln(Employment [NETS]) -0.079
(0.010)**
# observations 40709 40709 40709 39812
# establishment-focal years 13693 13693 13693 13518
# establishments 11059 11059 11059 10926
# Area Office-Years 386 386 386 386
Mean Dep Var, Controls 0.16 5.39 5.39 5.35
Specification Poisson Poisson Poisson
The table shows the results of OLS or Poisson regressions with coefficient on
a Treated dummy and SEs in parentheses. OLS and Poisson coefficients are
estimates of the level, and percent, change in the dependent variable associated
with Treated, respectively. All regressions include Area Office-focal year, and
calendar year, fixed effects. Each regression also controls for the mean of the
dependent variable over the 4 years prior to the focal year (regressions with injury
count as dependent variable control for mean of log(1+ dependent variable)), and
the number of pre-period years over which this mean is calculated. Standard
errors clustered at the establishment-focal year level. +P<.1, *P<.05, **P<.01.
Regressions restricted to analysis sample, described in Table A.1, and a window
of the focal year and 4 years following.
Treated is a dummy equal to 1 in years beginning with the focal year, for estab-
lishments selected for SST inspection in the focal year.
Table B.4.3: ITT Effects of SST Inspection on Business Outcomes using ANCOVA
specification
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
ODI vars NETS vars
SST ln( ln( ln( ln( Min CCA
insp- emp) hours emp) sales) PAYDEX scoreb
ected worked) scorea
Treated 0.48 -0.0063 -0.0060 -0.0026 -0.0062 -0.062 0.015
(0.0056)** (0.0050) (0.0053) (0.0080) (0.0090) (0.14) (0.012)
# observations 79853 40709 40709 71387 71371 64099 32856
# establishment-focal years 16282 13693 13693 15937 15934 14772 7819
# establishments 13148 11059 11059 12877 12874 11963 6346
# Area Office-Years 386 386 386 386 386 386 386
Mean Dep Var, Controls 0.15 4.88 12.4 4.61 16.3 67.8 2.58
The table shows the results of OLS regressions with coefficient on a Treated dummy and SEs in parentheses.
The coefficient is an estimate of the level change in the dependent variable associated with Treated. All
regressions include Area Office-focal year, and calendar year, fixed effects. Each regression also controls for
the mean of the dependent variable over the 4 years prior to the focal year, and the number of pre-period
years over which this mean is calculated. Standard errors clustered at the establishment-focal year level.
+P<.1, *P<.05, **P<.01.
Regressions restricted to analysis sample, described in Table A.1, and a window of the focal year and 4
years following.
Treated is a dummy equal to 1 in years beginning with the focal year, for establishments selected for SST
inspection in the focal year.
a PAYDEX is a monthly score ranging 0-100 assigned to an establishment by Dun & Bradstreet refelecting
the speed with which an establishment pays back its creditors, with higher scores reflecting faster pay. The
Min PAYDEX is the minimum score over all monthly reports in a year.
b CCA (Composite Credit Appraisal) score is Dun and Bradstreet's overall assessment of an establishment's
creditworthiness
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Table B.4.4: ITT Effects of SST Inspection on OSHA compliance-related outcomes
using ANCOVA specification
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Non SST prog-,
rammed inspections
SST Any # sum of
insp- complaint viols gravity
ected insp
Treated 0.54 -0.00053 -0.50 -1.03
(0.0063)** (0.0014) (0.39) (1.52)
# observations 79853 79853 410 410
# establishment-focal years 16282 16282 368 368
# establishments 13148 13148 337 337
# Area Office-Years 386 386 177 177
Mean Dep Var, Controls 0.18 0.026 1.75 5.21
The table shows the results of OLS regressions with coefficient on a Treated
dummy and SEs in parentheses. The coefficient is an estimate of the level
change in the dependent variable associated with Treated. All regressions
include Area Office-focal year, and calendar year, fixed effects. Each regres-
sion also controls for the mean of the dependent variable over the 4 years
prior to the focal year, and the number of pre-period years over which this
mean is calculated. Standard errors clustered at the establishment-focal
year level. +P<.1, *P<.05, **P<.01.
The sample in Columns 3-4 is restricted to years in which an establishment
experiences at least one non-SST programmed inspection.
Regressions restricted to analysis sample, described in Table A.1, and a
window of + or - 4 years from focal year.
Treated is a dummy equal to 1 in years beginning with the focal year, for
establishments selected for SST inspection in the focal year.
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The figure shows the density of estimates of each measure in the focal
year for establishments in the analysis sample.
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Table C.0.1: State Tabulation
Number
AL 5
AZ 3
CA 54
CO 5
CT 4
DC 1
FL 15
GA 3
IA 3
IL 19
IN 7
KS 2
KY 2
LA 2
MA 4
MD 5
ME 2
MI 3
MN 4
MO 6
MT 1
NC 2
NE 1
NH 1
NJ 5
NM 1
NV 1
NY 9
OH 5
OK 1
OR 2
PA 10
RI 1
SC 1
SD 1
TN 2
TX 9
VA 5
WA 3
WI 7
Total 217
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Table C.0.2: The Interaction Effect of the Minimum Wage and Labor Supply on
NCA Usage
(1) (2)
DV = last hire signed NCA
Num applicants for last vacancy 0.011 -0.0047
(0.0045)** (0.012)
Minimum Cash Wage 0.043 0.021
(0.028) (0.033)
Num applicants for last vacancy × Minimum Cash Wage 0.0023
(0.0014)
Observations 99 99
R2 0.169 0.188
Mean Dep Var 0.414 0.414
Bishara Score Y Y
Other Controls Y Y
The dependent variable is a dummy equual to 1 if the most recently hired stylist signed
a NCA, and the sample is restricted to salons which are employment-based
Bishara score is a standardized measure of each state's enforceability of NCAs.
Other controls include the percent of a salon's stylists hired right out of school, a dummy
for employmnent-based salons, annual revenue from the previous year, the number of
years the owner has been in the beauty industry, and the number of salons in a respon-
dent's county.
Linear Probability Model. Robust SEs in parentheses. ***P<.01., **P<.05, *P<.1
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